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7 The World Bank’s uses of the “rule of law”
promise in economic development
Alvaro Santos∗
INTRODUCTION
Law is at the center of development discourse and practice today. The idea that
the legal system is crucial for economic growth now forms part of the conven-
tional wisdom in development theory. This idea’s most common expression is
the “rule of law” (ROL): a legal order consisting of predictable, enforceable
and efficient rules required for a market economy to flourish. Enthusiasm for
law reform as a development strategy boomed during the 1990s and resources
for reforming legal systems soared everywhere.1
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1 The World Bank estimates to have supported 330 “rule of law” projects dealing with legal and
judicial reform in over 100 countries. Legal and Judicial Reform Observations, Experiences, and
Approach of the Legal Vice Presidency, Legal Vice Presidency, The World Bank, p. 14, (2002)
http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/publications/ljrobservations-final.pdf [hereinafter Obser-
vations, Experiences and Approach]. It has spent about $3.8 billion since 1993 (World Bank
Annual Reports 2003 and 2004, p. 30 and 35, respectively). See Thomas Carothers, The rule of
law revival, 77 Foreign Affairs 95–107 (1998) (noting the expansion of legal reform programs);
Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth (Eds.), Global Prescriptions: The Production, Expor-
tation, and Importation Of A New Legal Orthodoxy (2002) (analyzing how international
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After more than a decade of reforms of the legal systems, and particularly
of the judiciaries of developing countries around the world we are in a posi-
tion to analyze the theoretical premises of the programs and the strategies
of implementation. By many compelling accounts, these projects have been
disappointing, failing to deliver the expected results. On the one hand these
critiques challenge the theory that a preordained legal institutional frame-
work is necessary for economic growth. On the other, they review particular
reforms of laws and of judicial systems carried out in a variety of countries.
However, despite these critiques, the appeal to establishing the “rule of law”
by the “right” combination of legal rules and institutions continues to spur
hope and inspire reforms.
The critical energy comes from both veterans of the “Law and Development
Movement”2 and from contemporary scholars in the field.3 In addition, a
number of current participants in these reforms have voiced criticisms of
the strategies and projects promoted by their institutions.4 I endorse this
critical practice and to some extent, this chapter forms part of and benefits
from that enterprise. However, rather than insisting that these available and
powerful critiques must be considered, I intend to explore the persistence
of the assumptions about the relationship between law and development by
looking at the conditions that have made the “rule of law” such an enduring
strategy. Thus, the first question I explore is what makes projects of legal and
development institutions and other transnational actors participate in promoting a particular
set of legal reforms, believed to be favorable to economic development and democracy).
2 For a classic account of this movement see David Trubek and Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United
States 4 Wisconsin Law Review: 1062–1102 (1974). See Trubek’s contribution to this volume
for a comparison of the current boom in law and development projects with the earlier reform
effort in which he took part.
3 See Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing restructuring: law, distribution and gender in the
structure of market reform (2002); Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globaliza-
tion, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 243
(2000); John Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the Developmental
States of Northeast Asia, in Law and Development in East and Southeast Asia 91 (Christoph
Antons, ed., 2003); Jorge Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 Florida
Law Review 41 (2003), Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International law from below: develop-
ment, social movements, and Third World resistance, (2003); Joel Ngugi, Re-examining the
Role of Private Property in Market Democracies: Problematic Ideological Issues Raised by Land
Registration, 25 Mich. J. Int’l l. 467 (2004); James Ghatti, Retelling Good Governance Narra-
tives on Africa’s Economic and Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal
Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 Villanova Law Review 5, 971(2000).
4 See Linn Hammergren, International Assistance to Latin American Justice Programs: Toward
an Agenda for Reforming the Reformers 309, in Beyond Common Knowledge, Empirical
Approaches to the Rule of Law (Erik G. Jensen and Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003). See
also Richard Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14
The World Bank Research Observer 117 (February 1999), http://www1.worldbank.org/pub-
licsector/legal/Research%20Observer%20Paper.doc; (raising concerns on the lack of knowl-
edge about what these reforms should consist of and about its economic impact).
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judicial reform so immune from these available critiques and from increasing
evidence of their scant success. Thinking about what makes the continuation
of these projects so appealing should help explain why the “rule of law” is so
central to the way we speak about the process of development.
In exploring this question, my work benefits from and at the same time
enters a discussion with other scholarly work on how the “rule of law” idea
has lent more credibility to international financial institutions, in their pro-
motion of a specific set of economic policies in developing countries. My
work departs from this literature however to the extent that some of this
work assumes that the Word Bank is a monolithic institution with a single
agenda.
The starting point of many critiques of the World Bank’s work is to assume a
consensus within the Bank about the strategy and programs for development.
I propose to invert this assumption and begin from the opposite end. What
makes the projects of the different groups in the Bank “hang together” in an
apparently coherent way? The internal dynamics in the Bank suggest the lack
of a consensus – let’s call it a dissensus – among various groups working on
“rule of law” projects about how it is that law will advance economic develop-
ment. Thus, when confronted with the resemblance of a unified vision and
strategy among these groups, the question I would like to pose is this: what
causes the reduction of the dissensus?
In this chapter, I seek to disaggregate the Bank and provide insight on the
impact that particular groups have in dominant development strategies. By
analyzing the internal dynamics among groups at the Bank, I aim to illu-
minate the rise and fall of ideas about development and their resistance to
both empirical evidence and academic critique. These internal dynamics
include institutional inertia and constraints, groups’ struggle and competi-
tion over resources and prestige, and the relationship between groups at the
Bank and the governments of borrowing countries.
My argument is that the conceptions of the rule of law behind these various
projects need not be, and indeed are not, consistent with each other. They
often conflict, but their inconsistencies or contradictions regularly go unno-
ticed due to a conceptually confused discussion coupled with the dynamics
of a complex institution. To explore this point, this chapter undertakes both
a conceptual analysis of the “rule of law” and an institutional analysis of
the dynamics among the groups leading these projects in the Bank. I give
an account of the ways in which the rule of law rhetoric within the Bank
forecloses an analysis about the very policies these reforms introduce, their
consequences among groups in society, and their ultimate relationship to
economic development. Finally, I argue that the agenda for the rule of law
is not exclusively about the role of law in economic development. It is also
about defining and expanding the role of the World Bank groups in domestic
policies around the world.
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I develop my argument in three parts. In the first part, I will sketch four
conceptions of the rule of law, developed in jurisprudence and in the literature
of economic development, as a template with which to analyze the Bank’s
strategies and the position of the various groups on the subject. I consider
the lack of conceptual agreement on the meaning of the rule of law and explore
its multiple interpretations, as well as the overlap and tensions among these
conceptions. I argue that these various conceptions of the rule of law, as
channeled in the Bank, constitute a hodge-podge that enables different and
often conflicting projects to be pursued under the same agenda.
In the second part, I provide an overview of the World Bank’s engagement
with the rule of law, describing the different conceptions of the rule of law
introduced at various points in time. I analyze how, since its inception, the
rule of law has been a powerful rhetoric to justify the Bank’s involvement
in reforming developing countries’ legal and judicial systems and to por-
tray this endeavor as an apolitical one. I describe how the rule of law rhetoric
has dramatically expanded from an instrumental conception focused on eco-
nomic considerations to an intrinsic conception that values legal and judicial
reforms as good on their own right and considers them an inherent part of
the development process.
The third part will look at the practice of rule of law projects and describe
the various divisions in the World Bank currently engaged in reforming courts
and laws. I will highlight which conceptions of the rule of law these units have
adopted and describe how, despite internal disparities and conflicting views
among them, their agendas reinforce each other in what seems a common
position. I offer an analysis on this apparent consensus at two levels. First,
I describe how the conceptual hodge-podge bonds under the same rubric
different agendas and competing interests. Second, I analyze the dynamics
among the various World Bank groups, and the relationships between these
groups and the borrowing countries. I will show how this implicit consensus
enables them to discount unfavorable results, support the continuation of
their projects and validate a variety of different policies.
THE RULE OF LAW
In this discussion, my purpose is to shed light on the multiplicity of concep-
tions of the rule of law at play in the discourse of development institutions.
I seek to explore the ways in which people deploy and articulate the differ-
ent conceptions of the rule of law, in what I see as a sort of hodge-podge
that remains difficult to disentangle. Moreover, I argue that this amalgam of
undifferentiated conceptions greatly contributes to the strength and appeal
of the rule of law as it is used today. Before I examine just how I think this
hodge-podge works in World Bank practice, I will review some of the main
interpretations of the rule of law and offer a classification. This framework
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will help to clarify how these conceptions coexist in development assistance
projects, how they are used interchangeably by the groups in the Bank, and
with what effects.
Anyone seeking to understand what the “rule of law” is will find that the
term is unclear and ambiguous. Indeed, the meaning of the “rule of law”
has been the subject of disagreements and heated debates among scholars.
Whenever people invoke the rule of law, they advance one or several of this
term’s possible interpretations as if these were obvious or required. In this
section, I will explore various conceptions of the idea of the “rule of law” that
will serve as an analytical framework helping to probe deeper into the Bank’s
use of this idea in its strategy and projects.
Discussion of the rule of law ideal can be found in the writings of political
theorists like Aristotle, Montesquieu and Locke, who were concerned with
devising limits to the power of the government. For Aristotle, who proposed
that law rather than any single one of the citizens ruled, the ideal was a society
governed by reason and not by passion.5 Montesquieu envisioned a system
of institutional restraints that could limit governmental exercise of power
against citizens and guarantee individuals’ freedom from fear and the threat
of violence. Achieving this goal required a political system where power could
check power, preventing the whims of the king or the discretion of the legis-
lature to fall upon individuals. An independent judiciary was needed in order
to check the powers of the executive.6 Locke reasoned that the preservation
of individuals’ property – the chief aim of men entering a political society –
was guaranteed by three conditions: first, established law agreed by consent;
second, an independent judge with power to decide controversies according
to law; and third, a power to execute the sentence.7
Scholars writing about the rule of law rely on these and other sources for
authority on what the concept means. There is however, little agreement on
how the conceptions of these different authors and their positions relate to
one another. Some scholars have noticed the ambivalence or vagueness of the
term and the multiple ways in which it may be deployed by different actors for
a variety of purposes.8 Even a number of scholars and analysts more closely
5 Aristotle, The Politics, Book III, Part 16 (Tr. T. A. Sinclair, 1962) (“He who asks Law to rule is
asking God and Intelligence and no others to rule; while he who asks for the rule of a human
being is bringing in a wild beast. . . . In law you have the intellect without passions.”) p. 142–143.
6 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Bk. VI, chs. 1–6 (1748) (ed. David Wallace 1977). See Judith
Skhlar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in The Rule of Law, Ideal or Ideology (Hutchinson
and Monahan eds., 1987) (discussing Aristotle and Montesquieu as representatives of two
distinct visions on the rule of law – one the reign of reason, the other institutional guarantees
for the protection of individuals against state power).
7 John Locke, the Second Treatise of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, 1988, pp. 350–353.
8 See, for example, Thomas Carothers, The Many Agendas of Rule of Law Reform, in Latin America,
in Rule of law in Latin America: The International Promotion of Judicial Reform, pp. 4–
15 (Pilar Domingo and Rachel Sieder eds., 2001); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of
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involved with the Bank have expressed caution about the use of the term and
its imprecise nature.9
The following discussion presents, in a schematic form, four different con-
ceptions of the rule of law. These conceptions are organized around two main
criteria: the degree of autonomy of the legal order from other orders like
morals and politics, and the degree of relative value against competing con-
siderations. The first criterion of classification makes a distinction between
an institutional and a substantive conception of the rule of law.10 For those
who support the institutional conception, judgment about the existence of
the rule of law would be rendered based on whether the rules comply with
certain requirements, internal to the legal order, that make law efficacious.
This view does not pass judgment upon, and is indifferent about, the actual
content of these rules. This conception provides no normative criteria to eval-
uate whether the law in question is a good or a bad law.11 Thus, the rule of law
can exist regardless of whether we consider it fair, democratic, or just.12 In
contrast, a substantive vision of the rule of law takes these formal character-
istics for granted but requires that rules enshrine specific values. It requires
the existence of specific rights that are considered to be inherent to such a
system.13 Existence of these rights becomes the yardstick to judge whether a
law is a good law or a bad law.
The second criterion of classification distinguishes between an instrumen-
tal and an intrinsic conception of the rule of law. For those who support the
Law Orthodoxy, Carnegie Endowment Working Paper, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule
of Law Project, #30, September 2002; John Ohnesorge, supra note 3; Gianmaria Ajani, The
Transplant of Vague Notions (on file with the author).
9 See, for example, Matthew Stephenson, The Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy
(available under Rule of Law and Development section at http://www.worldbank.org/lji, and
Mathew Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?: Problems and Prospects of US-
Sponsored “Rule of Law” Reform Projects in the PRC, CID Working Paper #47, Center for Interna-
tional Development, Harvard University (2000) http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/047.htm.
10 I use the term institutional instead of the more-often used term formal to emphasize the
role of society’s specialized institutions, particularly that of the judiciary, in the application
of rules. But apart from this qualification I use the term institutional as equivalent to formal.
For an analysis of the differences between formal and substantive conceptions, see Paul Craig,
Formal and substantive conceptions of the Rule of Law: An analytical framework, Public Law
467, Autumn 1997, 467–487. See also Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modern Society (1976) 48–
58 (analyzing the substantive, institutional, methodological and occupational aspects of an
autonomous legal order associated with the rule of law ideal). For an excellent recent treatise
on the rule of law, see Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law (2004).
11 See Craig, supra note 10 at 467.
12 For an endorsement of this formal conception see Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue,
93 Law Quarterly Review 195 (1977).
13 The most prominent contemporary legal philosopher upholding this position is Ronald
Dworkin. Coined by him as the rights conception, this view does not distinguish between
substantive justice and the rule of law. This conception requires that the formal rules reflect
and enforce moral rights. See Ronald Dworkin, a matter of principle (1985) 11–12.
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TABLE 1. Rule of Law Conceptions
Degree of differentiation of legal
norms (from other systems like
morals-politics)
Institutional Substantive
Degree of relative value Instrumental Max Weber Friedrich Hayek
against other competing
considerations Intrinsic A.V. Dicey Amartya Sen
instrumental conception, the rule of law is an effective mechanism to achieve
whatever goals a society has set for itself. It is, in other words, an important
means for the realization of a society’s ideals in the organization of govern-
ment power, relations of production, and social order.14 Moreover, the rule of
law is certainly a value of a society’s legal system, but it is one among many
competing values to be considered. Sometimes, a society may want to over-
ride the rule of law because of other values deemed of higher importance,
such as national emergency or substantive justice.15 In contrast, those sup-
porting an intrinsic conception of the rule of law consider it a goal in its own
right. The rule of law enshrines the greatest values that societies can aspire
to, such as justice, democracy, or freedom and it cannot be compromised
without foregoing these values.
In the following discussion, I depict these conceptions as ideal-types, relat-
ing each conception with a scholar to explore their differences and overlap-
ping elements. These ideal-types should be understood in a continuum rather
than in opposition. Table 1 illustrates the conceptions of the rule of law just
explained.
Institutional conception
An institutional conception of the rule of law is mainly concerned with the
efficacy of a system of rules. Joseph Raz, a prominent advocate of this concep-
tion, highlights two fundamental aspects. First, government action should be
authorized by law, and second, laws should be capable of guiding people’s
conduct for them to plan their life.16 This conception emphasizes the formal
14 For an account of this instrumental conception, see Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudi-
cation, (1997) pp. 13–14.
15 See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 14.
16 To effectively enable individuals to plan their lives, rules should be prospective and stable.
Particular laws should be guided by open, general and clear rules. There should be an indepen-
dent judiciary to which all citizens have access and the discretion of law enforcement agencies
should not undermine the purposes of the relevant legal rules. Joseph Raz, supra note 12 at
196. See also Paul Craig, supra note 10 at 469.
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characteristics of a legal system that ensure that the rules are available and
that they are susceptible of being followed.17 What are these characteris-
tics? There is of course no definitive list, but among the elements generally
included are: 1) generality, 2) notice or publicity, 3) prospectivity, 4) clarity,
5) noncontradictoriness, 6) conformability, 7) stability, and 8) congruence.18
If the rules reflect these characteristics they will enable the addressees “to
know what they are commanded to do” and “to do what is commanded of
them.”19 The aim of these requirements is the establishment of “rule-like
commands that can successfully induce desired behavior (whatever it is) in
the addressees.”20 Thus, we may conclude that an institutional conception
refers to the qualities and mechanisms of the rules in a legal system. This view
is not concerned with the content of the rules and the values they uphold but
rather on whether the legal system has the formal characteristics that make
it work.
As anticipated above, the institutional conception can be divided in two
further categories. Operating entirely with criteria internal to the legal order, it
is possible to identify an instrumental version of the institutional conception
of the rule of law and an intrinsic one. In the following sections, I discuss
these categories with reference to the work of Max Weber and A.V. Dicey.
Instrumental version. A classic formulation of this conception of the rule of
law is found in Max Weber’s work on the relationship between “rational law”
and economic development.21 Weber argued that his ideal type of “logically
formal rationality” as a system of general, universally applied rules was at
the core of western industrialization. This type of law constituted the basis
of legal domination and as such the nature of “modern” law and thus the
“modern state.”22 The most important element of a legal system containing
such characteristics was its high degree of stability and calculability. These
features enabled individuals to predict the actions of other individuals and of
the state and thus to engage securely in economic transactions. This system
of rules created the social discipline necessary for a modern state where eco-
nomic development could thrive.23 Thus, these formal rules were the means
through which individuals could enter into predictable economic transac-
tions that would ultimately lead to economic growth.
17 See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 64 B.U.L.Rev. 781 (1989), 784.
18 See generally Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law 33–94 (Ed. 1969).
19 Radin, supra note 17, at 786.
20 Id.
21 See Max Weber, Economy and Society (1968).
22 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, WISC L. REV. 720 (1972).
23 See G. Myrdal, The Soft State in Underdeveloped Countries, 15 Ucla L.Rev. 1118 (1968) (dis-
cussing the relationship between a “soft” state and underdevelopment. ‘Soft” development
would be characterized as a general lack of social discipline signified by deficiencies in law
observance and enforcement.)
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It is worth noting that Weber was reluctant to define the modern state
and its legal order based on the purpose of the political community or value
judgments that inspired the belief in its legitimacy. In Weber’s view, political
communities could pursue any conceivable end without losing the character
of a modern state just as charismatic leadership could be personified by a
holy man or a tyrant.24 The immediate implication of this position is that the
rule of law, as Weber conceived it, can exist in any political order.25
Intrinsic version. The work that best exemplifies the intrinsic/institutional
conception is that of A.V. Dicey, who set out to explain the meaning of the term
“rule, supremacy, or predominance of law” as one of the distinguishing char-
acteristics of the English institutions. He identified three features of the rule
of law and accorded to them a distinctively English origin. The first meaning
refers to the absence of arbitrary power on the part of the government. Dicey
put it this way:
[N]o man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except
for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the
ordinary courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law contrasted with every
system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide,
arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.26
Dicey considered this feature a peculiarity of the English institutions or of
those countries that had inherited English traditions. He believed that in the
continental tradition the executive exercised far wider discretionary author-
ity than the government in England. This discretion enabled government’s
arbitrariness and thus threatened the individual’s legal freedom.27
In the second instance, the rule of law meant legal equality, or more pre-
cisely, that every person, regardless of his or her position, is subject to ordinary
law administered by ordinary tribunals.
[N]ot only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that
here every man, whatever his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of
the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.28
24 See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (1978), pp. 417–420.
25 Joseph Raz makes precisely this point when he argues that the rule of law “is not to be confused
with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or
respect for persons or for the dignity of man.” In Raz’s view, a non-democratic legal system
may be perfectly capable of conforming to the rule of law ideal. See Raz, supra note 12, at 196.
26 A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (10th ed., 1959), p. 188.
27 Id. 188. Dicey’s attribution of the rule of law to the English institutions in opposition to con-
tinental institutions has been challenged by several legal scholars, most notably by Sir Ivor
Jennings (The Law and the Constitution, 1952); See also H.W. Arthurs, Without the Law,
Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (1985).
28 Dicey, supra note 26, at 193.
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Dicey saw this trait also as a particularity of England, where every official,
from the prime minister to a constable, is as any other citizen, responsible
for every act done without legal justification. Thus, officials acting in their
official capacity but exceeding their lawful authority are brought to courts and
made, in their personal capacity, liable to punishment or to the payment of
damages.29 Dicey contrasted this state of affairs with the continent, where he
argued that officials acting in their official capacity were regularly protected
from the ordinary law of the land, the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals, and
sometimes subject only to official law administered by official organs.30
Finally, in a third sense, under the rule of law constitutional norms are the
result of ordinary law as established by ordinary courts. Dicey maintained
that:
[T]he general principles of the constitution (as for example the right to personal
liberty or the right of public meeting) are with us the result of judicial decision
determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the
courts, whereas under many foreign constitutions the security (such as it is) given
to the rights of individuals results, or appears to result, from the general principles
of the constitution.31
For Dicey, the English constitution is judge-made and the rights of individu-
als are mere generalizations drawn from decisions of the judges. In contrast,
in continental Europe individual rights are deductions drawn from the prin-
ciples of the constitution, which is the result of a legislative act. Dicey admits
this distinction may be merely a formal one, but he considers that continental
constitutionalists have defined rights without giving adequate consideration
to providing the remedies to enforce such rights.
Nothing in any of these three prongs of the rule of law, as developed by
Dicey, would conclusively indicate that in order to establish the rule of law
countries should enact a specific content in their laws or possess specific
individual rights. Dicey argued adamantly for the common law as a more
effective technique to protect such rights as compared to continental legal
systems, but he did not make the rule of law hinge upon the existence of a
given set of individual rights.32 In this sense, Dicey’s conception of the rule
of law is internal to the legal order and it can be qualified as institutional.
The definition and content of the rights available depends on myriad judi-
cial decisions that have been gradually accumulating to formulate a remedy
against a wrongdoing in the form of a right.
At the same time, Dicey identifies the rule of law with particular traits of
the legal system: due process, authority’s submission to its own law, and
29 Id., at 193.
30 Id., at 195.
31 Id., at 196.
32 Craig, supra note 10, at 472–474.
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a constitution consisting of judicially declared rights for which there are
enforceable remedies. These qualities, which he so proudly found in the
English system, are in Dicey’s view constitutive elements of any political com-
munity governed by the rule of law. I would argue that Dicey’s position is in
this sense intrinsic because the rule of law must be pursued in its own right.
Moreover, the rule of law should be viewed not as one virtue among many
competing virtues of a constitutional political system, but as what having a
constitutional system is all about. In Dicey’s words, “the suspension of the
constitution, as far as such a thing can be conceived possible, would mean
with us nothing less than a revolution.”33
Substantive conception
A substantive conception of the rule of law takes the formal characteristics of
the institutional conception for granted but requires the existence of specific
rights that are considered to be inherent in such a system. It is also possi-
ble to identify, within the substantive conception, an instrumental and an
intrinsic version. I will explore them analyzing the work of Friedrich Hayek
and Amartya Sen.
Instrumental version. A powerful example of this position is articulated by
Friedrich Hayek. In the instrumentalist version, Hayek regards the rule of
law as a system that articulates a free market economy. For Hayek, whereas
under the rule of law there is a permanent framework of rules within which
individual decisions guide the productive activity, under arbitrary govern-
ment a central authority directs the economy.34 The rules establishing this
framework under the rule of law have certain characteristics:
[This] type of rules can be made in advance, in the shape of formal rules, which
do not aim at the wants and needs of particular people. They are intended to be
merely instrumental in the pursuit of people’s various individual ends. And they
are, or ought to be, intended for such long periods that it is impossible to know
whether they will assist particular people more than others. They could almost
be described as a kind of instrument of production, helping people to predict
the behaviour of those with whom they must collaborate, rather than as efforts
toward satisfaction of particular needs.35
Because of the system of rules in place, individuals are able to foresee with
certainty how the government would use its coercive power in given cir-
cumstances and thus plan their affairs accordingly. Individuals are able to
33 Dicey, supra note 26, at 202.
34 Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944), p.80–96.
35 Id. 81.
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calculate because the government is bound by rules laid down in advance, of
which individuals have knowledge. According to Hayek:
[U]nder the rule of law the government is prevented from stultifying individual
efforts by ad hoc action. Within the known rules of the game the individual is free
to pursue his personal ends and desires, certain that powers of government will
not be used deliberately to frustrate his efforts.36
Hayek insists that the rule of law requires particular kinds of rules that would
allow individuals to calculate and predict their interactions with other indi-
viduals and the state but also that would keep the government at bay from
making decisions of production and exchange in the market. He draws a
distinction between these formal rules and rules that depend on particu-
lar circumstances at a given moment and evaluate the interests of various
persons and groups. In the second kind of rules, the government decides
whose interest is more important, coercively imposing a new distinction of
rank upon people. Thus, the most important criterion of formal rules, accord-
ing to Hayek, is that we do not know their concrete effects, the ends they will
pursue, or the people they will assist. In this sense, formal rules “do not involve
a choice between particular ends or particular people” because we are igno-
rant of who will use them and for what purposes. For Hayek, not knowing the
particular effects of the state’s measures is in fact the rationale of the “great
liberal principle of the Rule of Law.”37
The unpredictability of the particular effects is what Hayek holds to be the
distinguishing feature of formal laws of the liberal system. This criterion is
the yardstick with which to measure individual freedom under state action.
For Hayek, the Rule of Law is “the legal embodiment of freedom.” As such,
it is not concerned with whether government actions are legal in a juridical
sense. These actions may be legal but inconsistent with the Rule of Law. If the
law gives the government powers to act arbitrarily, or more precisely, if the
government’s use of its coercive power is not limited by pre-established rules
then the Rule of Law does not prevail.38 Hayek stresses that:
[U]nder the rule of law the private citizen and his property are not an object of
administration by the government, not a means to be used for its Purpose. It is
only when the administration interferes with the private sphere of the citizen
that the problem of discretion becomes relevant to us; and the principle of the
rule of law, in effect, means that the administrative authorities should have no
discretionary powers in this respect.39
In order to preclude this discretion, an independent court must be able to




39 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 212 (1978).
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the authority, the judiciary must look not only at whether the executive has
acted within its powers – whether the authority was legally entitled to act –
but also whether the substance of administrative action fell within the gov-
ernment’s powers or impinged upon the citizen’s private property.
Intrinsic version. Amartya Sen upholds an intrinsic vision of the rule of law,
which propounds that the legal system ought to be judged according to
whether it enables peoples’ capability to exercise their rights. The rule of law
and the enhancement of people’s freedoms should not be viewed as means
to achieve certain ends, but as ends in their own right.
Sen argues that conceptual integrity requires us to see legal development as
a constitutive part of the development process, regardless of its effects on the
economic, political, and social areas. Development as a whole is an amalgam
of developments in the distinct economic, legal, political, and social domains.
The point is not that legal development causally influences development
as a whole but rather that development as a whole cannot be considered
separately from legal development.40 From this perspective, Sen effectively
de-centers the economic aspect of development, asserting that:
[E]ven if legal development were not to contribute one iota to economic devel-
opment . . . even then legal and judicial reform would be a critical part of the
development process.”41
So far, Sen makes two distinct arguments. First, a conceptually integrated
form of development makes it impossible to think of any given sphere of
development in isolation. On the contrary, we must understand them “hang-
ing together,” in a relation of necessity with one another. The connection
of each of the different domains – legal, economic, political, social – is con-
stitutive of development. The point here is not one of a relation of causal-
ity between each domain and development but rather that development
as a whole cannot be considered separately from the development in each
domain. Development in an integrated form will consider legal development
just as importantly as the economic, social, or political domains.
Second, assessing development in each domain requires us to go beyond
its formal aspects. In this view, the rule of law is not “about what the law
is and what the judicial system formally accepts and asserts” but rather it
must constitutively consider “the enhancement of peoples’ capability – their
substantive freedom – to exercise the rights and entitlements. Seen in this
light, development in each domain is related, indeed causally interrelated, to
40 Amartya Sen, What is the role of legal and judicial reform in economic development? p.8,
(Lecture delivered at the first World Bank conference on Comprehensive Legal and Judi-
cial Development, Washington, DC, June 5, 2000), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector
/legal/legalandjudicail.pdf). See generally Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999).
41 Sen, What is the role of legal and judicial reform in economic development? p. 10.
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instruments and policies in the other domains that cannot be excluded from
consideration.
If we accept Sen’s view on the conceptual integrity of development, legal
development “must be seen as important on its own as a part of the develop-
ment process, and not merely as a means to an end of other kinds of develop-
ment, such as economic development.”42 This point is crucial for Sen, who
wants to challenge the exclusive focus on the market system that he considers
so prevalent in development studies and policy-making.43
THE WORLD BANK’S USES OF THE RULE OF LAW
The ubiquitous invocation of the rule of law (ROL) by international develop-
ment institutions like the World Bank is a relatively recent phenomenon. In
this section, I analyze how the conceptions of the ROL just described above
map out onto the rhetoric and policies of the World Bank. I trace back in time
the usage of the ROL concept in the Bank and discuss how the introduction
of the rule of law in the Bank was supposed to have a merely institutional
meaning but it encompassed a substantive one as well. Indeed, throughout
the 1990s, the World Bank’s ROL rhetoric has further broadened to include
the four conceptions previously discussed. Thus, starting out reflecting an
instrumental conception of the ROL, both in its institutional (Weber) and sub-
stantive (Hayek) versions, the Bank gradually expanded its rhetoric to include
an intrinsic conception, in its institutional (Dicey) and substantive (Sen) ver-
sions. I will conclude the section showing how current World Bank rhetoric
consists of a hodge-podge reflecting multiple conceptions of the ROL.
By providing an account of its multiple uses, I seek to clarify how the rule
of law has been a powerful conceptual and rhetorical tool to garner sup-
port for substantive legal reforms that have important political, social, and
economic implications in the countries they are implemented. By appeal to
the ROL, however, these reforms are often presented as merely institutional,
economically efficient, and apolitical. Moreover, the shift in emphasis from
an instrumental to an intrinsic version of the ROL is not necessarily corre-
lated to a shift in projects. Whereas projects of legal and judicial reform have
remained more or less stable, the rhetoric has shifted often making the same
projects look better by the mere shift in language.
42 Id., at 13.
43 In an essay commemorating the 60th anniversary of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, Sen recog-
nized Hayek as a champion of the proposition that societal institutions, including the market,
should be judged by the degree to which they promote freedom. However, Sen noted that
Hayek’s fascination with the market’s enabling effects on freedoms made him downplay “the
lack of freedom for some that may result from a complete reliance on the market system,
with exclusions and imperfections, and the social effects of big disparities in the ownership of
assets”. Amartya Sen, An insight into the purpose of prosperity, Financial Times (September 27,
2004).
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The policy models of the World Bank
The story of the Bank’s activities on rule of law projects can be told by situat-
ing them within the main development models of the Bank in three different
periods. The first period, that of “structural adjustment,” goes from 1980 to
1990. The second period, which witnesses the emergence of “governance”
runs from 1990 to 1999. The last period, from 1999 onward is one of “compre-
hensive development.” These three periods attest to the changes in thinking
about economic development. Broadly speaking, they encompass the rise
and fall of neoliberal thinking, or the so-called Washington Consensus, and
the subsequent move to an “enlightened” Washington Consensus, mediated
by a decade of profound reforms and severe crisis. These periods provide
the framework of the World Bank’s engagement with the ROL, facilitating an
analysis of the ROL rhetoric in conjunction with changes in development
thinking and policy models.
“Structural adjustment” was a period of market shock and trade liberaliza-
tion. In the midst of the debt crisis in the beginning of the 1980s the Bank
started a lending practice that made disbursements conditional upon the
implementation of reform programs in macroeconomic and financial man-
agement.44 The Bank’s involvement in reforming developing countries’ laws
and legal systems predates the introduction of the notion of the rule of law in
the Bank’s projects. The notion of the “rule of law” was not part of the develop-
ment strategy and was thus absent from reform proposals. However, the Bank
assisted borrowing countries in a wide variety of legal changes deemed neces-
sary to implement the macroeconomic policies agreed to as part of structural
adjustment loans. Legal reforms were thus a condition for loan disbursement.
They were narrowly tailored to introduce fiscal reform, ending exchange-rate
controls, liberalizing trade, securing property rights, ending subsidies, and
privatizing state-owned enterprises.45
44 Designed as an exception to its lending practice to address the balance of payment crisis of the
late 1970s, these loans increased dramatically in the 1980s and extended to the adjustment of
a wide range of sectors. These reforms required widespread legislative changes in a variety of
areas; especially those “enabling business environment” such as property law, commercial law,
anti-trust, foreign investment, tax, banking, and labor regulation. During the 1980s adjustment
lending represented 18% of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
and 12% of International Development Association (IDA), the two main lending institutions of
the Bank. It accounted for 33% of total IBRD disbursement and 12% of IDA’s. Ibrahim Shihata,
The World Bank and “Governance” Issues in its Borrowing Members, in 1 The World Bank in a
Changing World, 53, 58 (1991).
45 The strategy that these legal changes sought to articulate consisted of three main areas:
1) macroeconomic management (realistic exchange rates, positive real interest rates, trade
liberalization), efficient resource allocation (replacement of price controls with competitive
markets) and the creation of a supportive legal and regulatory framework (reducing cost of
doing business and encouraging competition, streamlining procedures and reforming tax,
labor, investment, credit and corporate laws), 2) privatization or restructuring of state-owned
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The “governance” period was inaugurated by the dismemberment of the
Soviet Union, the dramatic political transformation of Eastern Europe and a
severe political crisis in the African continent in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Indeed, the term governance is supposed to have emerged from a World Bank
report evaluating the crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa and advancing recommen-
dations for a minimum institutional “governance” to create stable conditions
in these countries and assure the effectiveness of development assistance.46
In this context, the “rule of law” emerged as a central part of the strategy
for transforming these countries into market economies. With the introduc-
tion of the rule of law as an area of legitimate Bank intervention, law reform
became a priority and the Bank rapidly began to broaden its reach. During
this period, the Bank favored a long-term approach for projects of judicial
and legal reform and created independent loans, in the form of investment
or technical assistance that were not necessarily subject to conditionality.47
The current “comprehensive development” phase was inaugurated by
President James D. Wolfhenson’s strategy of a Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF).48 This strategy was launched as a response to the critiques
of the neoliberal economic policies and sought to turn from a focus on eco-
nomic growth to one of “interdependence” of all aspects of development. CDF
seeks to reconceptualize development by going beyond its macroeconomic
and financial aspects to focus on structural, social, and human concerns. The
quest is for a stable, equitable and sustainable development. The reduction
of poverty, or rather freedom from poverty, has been introduced as a central
part of the strategy.
enterprises to guarantee efficient provision of infrastructure and services (reducing or elim-
inating public monopolies, privatization and contracting out), and 3) developing financial
systems that mobilize and allocate financial resources efficiently (develop strong financial
markets, strengthen institutions promoting the private sector, and assisting micro enterprises,
small-scale agriculture, and the informal sector). Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank Facing the
21st Century – Developments in the Eighties and Prospects for the Nineties, in 1 The World
Bank in a Changing World 30 (1991). See also Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform, Legal
Vice Presidency, The World Bank (2002) http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/publications/LJR-
Initiatives-2003.pdf, p. 8.
46 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A long term perspec-
tive Study (1989); See also Ibrahim Shihata, 1 The World Bank in a Changing World (1991)
pp. 53–57.
47 Practically every lending operation includes, in one way or another, a component of legal
reform. It would be possible to classify operations according to how central legal reform is to
the project and to whether such legal reforms are conditioned. Thus, operations vary from: 1)
loans for capacity building and institutional development, which include components related
to legal reform, to 2) reforms stipulated as conditions of structural adjustment programs, to
3) “freestanding” legal and judicial reform projects. Freestanding projects have been used in
many countries. The first of these independent loans was given to China (1994). The largest
has been the Legal Reform Project in Russia, supported by a $58 million loan. See Initiatives in
Legal and Judicial Reform, supra note 45, 6–10.
48 James D. Wolfensohn, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (May 1999),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CDF/Resources/cdf.pdf.
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The World Bank rhetoric on the Rule of Law
In describing the incorporation of the “rule of law” agenda in the Bank, I
will focus on the writings of Ibrahim Shihata, general counsel and senior vice
president of the World Bank from 1983 to 1998. Shihata stands out as the main
architect of the “rule of law” in the Bank and as a bridge between different
phases and policy models pursued.49
Writing in 1990, Ibrahim Shihata inaugurated and set out to justify the
Bank’s work on governance.50 Mindful of the prohibitions against intervening
in countries’ internal political affairs under the Bank’s mandate, laid down
in its Articles of Agreement,51 Shihata undertook the task of defining gover-
nance and drawing its limits. Distinguishing those aspects of governance that
fell within the Bank’s mandate from those representing prohibited “political
considerations” became crucial for considering intervention in borrowing
countries without violating the Bank’s mandate.52 Revisiting Shihata’s expla-
nation reveals the difficulties he faced trying to expand the competence of
the Bank in areas understood to be reserved to the domestic jurisdiction of
States. Shihata aimed at carving out a new sphere of action for the Bank while
advocating its nonpolitical character. To achieve this, he emphasized the dis-
tinction between political and economic considerations, the former outside
the Bank’s reach, the latter within the Bank’s area of expertise. This is arguably
why Shihata preferred to speak of governance rather than government. Gov-
ernment was unmistakably political whereas governance deemphasized the
49 Shihata was by no means alone. As can be seen by the extent and scope of his publications, he
had a considerable team of collaborators who helped to formulate this new role for the Bank.
Thus, when I refer to Shihata I have in mind a position or school of thought led by him but not
of his sole creation. The position he developed can be found in the three volumes of Ibrahim
Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World (1991,1995,2000); Complementary Reform,
Essays on Legal, Judicial and Other Institutional Reforms Supported by the World Bank
(1997); and The World Bank Legal Papers (2000).
50 Shihata defined governance as “the manner in which a community is managed and directed,
including the making and administration of policy in matters of political control, as well as in
such economic issues as may be relevant to the management of the community’s resources;
it conveys the same meaning as government. . . . ” Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and
“Governance” Issues in its Borrowing Members, in 1 The World Bank in a Changing World
53 (1991), 85 (hereinafter The WB and Governance Issues); See also Ibrahim Shihata, Issues of
“Governance” in Borrowing Members – The Extent of their Relevance under the Bank’s Articles of
Agreement, in The World Bank Legal Papers 245 (2000), 268) (hereinafter Issues of Governance).
51 The Articles of Agreement of both IBRD (available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf) and IDA (available at http://site-
resources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/ida-articlesofagreement.pdf) contain three similar
provisions intended to prevent political intervention of these institutions in member coun-
tries and to prohibit the former from taking political or non-economic considerations into
account. These are Article III, Section 5(b); Article IV, Section 10; and Article V, Section 5(c) of
the IBRD Articles, and Article V, Section 1(g); Article V, Section 6; and Article VI, Section 5(c) of
the IDA Articles. See Shihata, The WB and Governance Issues, supra note 50, at 65–67.
52 See id. pp. 81–84.
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political character and stressed “management” of administrative and eco-
nomic resources.
The Rule of Law as an institutional framework. It is in this context that
Shihata first appealed to the rule of law, defining the sphere of legitimate
action within the Bank’s action in the “governance” strategy. For Shihata,
those aspects of governance consistent with the Bank’s mandate were found
in the meaning of “good order,” understood as:
[A] system, based on abstract rules which are actually applied, and on functioning
institutions which ensure the appropriate applications of such rules. This system
of rules and institutions is reflected in the concept of the rule of law, generally
known in different legal systems and often expressed in the familiar phrase of a
‘government of laws and not of men.’53
What are the characteristics of such a system of rules and institutions? Shihata
laid down five elements:
1) [T]here is a set of rules which are known in advance, 2) such rules are actually
in force, 3) mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application of the rules and to
follow for departure from them as needed according to established procedures,
4) conflicts in the application of the rules can be resolved through binding deci-
sions of an independent judicial body, and 5) there are known procedures for
amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose.54
There is nothing particularly innovative about this characterization of the
rule of law, as Shihata himself recognized. Probably, the reader will already
have situated Shihata’s characterization of the rule of law in the upper left
corner of Table 1 in the first section of this article,55 as an institutionalist-
instrumentalist approach. The sources to which Shihata refers in his discus-
sion further confirm this categorization.56
Shihata noted that the concept was known in other legal systems as well
under appellations such as the “supremacy of law,” and that it was not always
tied to the principle of separation of powers. Embarking on a brief history
of the notion, he referred to U.S. constitutional sources but made clear that
there was nothing particularly western in the concept, that it was known in
other systems and it had played a very important role in the evolution of
the Islamic legal system.57 Shihata’s most important point in this discussion
seems to be that the rule of law is compatible with a variety of different legal
systems and traditions. Moreover, he did not associate the rule of law with
democracy or for that matter with any particular type of political system or
53 See Shihata, The WB and Governance Issues, supra note 50, at 85 (emphasis added). Shihata,
Issues of Governance, supra note 50, at 272–273.
54 Id.
55 See Table 1, p. 259.
56 See Shihata, The WB and Governance Issues, supra note 50, p. 87, expressly referring to Weber’s
theory of the role of law in the economy.
57 See id. at 85, footnote 96.
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government. Nor did he argue that the rule of law should be embodied in
any particular kind of political and legal institutions. Shihata considered this
system of rules and institutions to be important prerequisites for developing
market economies. For this proposition, he referred to Weber’s ideal type of
“logically formal rationality” and the establishment of legal domination in a
modern state as conducive to economic growth.58 The relevance of the rule
of law in development, Shihata argued, was that the effectiveness of reform
policies would depend on a system capable of articulating them into workable
rules and ensuring its compliance.
Following Weber, Shihata insisted that a system containing the basic ele-
ments he had pointed out for the rule of law addressed “the process of the for-
mulation and application of rules, rather than the substance.”59 Thus, apart
perhaps from certain formal characteristics which legal rules should fulfill
in order to be observed and enforced, this approach tells us nothing about
what kind of rules have to be enacted. Shihata argued that in respect of their
content or substance, rules “will of course reflect the policies of each govern-
ment and should be based on its own choices and convictions.”60 Substantive
legal reform required profound knowledge of the economic and social situ-
ation in the country involved. Thus, Shihata concluded, legal reform could
not be imposed from the outside and could only be useful if it was done by
the country itself in response to its own needs.61
The Rule of Law as substantive rights and regulations. This is not, how-
ever, the whole story of Shihata’s articulation of the rule of law. In a subtle
but somewhat striking turn of position, performed in the same memoran-
dum interpreting the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, Shihata proposed that
the Bank assist countries in the design of laws related to its mandate, and
declared that it was free to condition loan disbursements upon adoption of
legal reforms needed to implement agreed economic policies. Moreover, he
argued, this focus on the content of the rules was appropriate as long as it was
“based on considerations of economy and efficiency.”62 This competence of
the Bank was to be distinguished, however, from the institutional setup as
a prerequisite of economic reform and stability.63 After all, Shihata seemed
to be arguing for the Bank’s involvement in the recommendation of specific
types of rules, which “based on considerations of economy and efficiency,”
the Bank’s traditional sphere of action, can serve as best practices for devel-
opment countries.
58 Id. at 87.
59 Id. at 86.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 89. He further noted that “as any student of law knows, legal evolution is normally based
on the interaction of the real forces in a community and reflects the evolving interests, values
and convictions that do exist with such a community.”
62 Id. at 86.
63 Shihata, Issues of Governance, supra note 50, at 273.
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At this point, we could interpret Shihata’s position as shifting from a
Weberian to a Hayekian conception of the rule of law, recommending specific
property and contract rights and regulations, and focusing on the substance
of the rules. Shihata justified the Bank’s involvement in the content of coun-
tries’ laws by the demand for legal reforms coming from countries. The claim
that it was countries that demanded these reforms needs to be taken with
caution. As is widely known, the Bank developed a lending practice that
required particular legal reforms from developing countries as a condition of
loan disbursement. In any event, Shihata contended that this demand came
from governments’ realization that the private sector could not develop in
the absence of an appropriate legal framework and well functioning mecha-
nisms and institutions that ensured enforcement of the law, protected prop-
erty and contracts, and settled disputes effectively.64 Shihata alluded to the
importance of having “an appropriate legal system, properly administered
and enforced, for creating an environment conducive to business develop-
ment.”65 But Shihata referred to these substantive rules of private law as a
framework or an environment conducive to business development, propos-
ing them as institutional, whereas they were in effect substantive. Thus,
the concept of substantive laws forming the appropriate legal system favor-
able to business was conflated with the institutional character of the legal
system.66
Furthermore, the impression of the merely institutional and not substantive
character of the Bank’s work in reforming countries’ private laws was rein-
forced by the limitations that Shihata laid down for the Bank’s jurisdiction
in projects of legal reform. In interpreting the Bank’s Articles of Agreement,
which define its mandate and scope of intervention, Shihata determined that
the World Bank could not work in the area of human rights, and specifically
of civil and political rights. That was, in his view, definitely a political area
that had to be left in the hands of each country’s political system.67 Shihata
also contrasted the Bank’s jurisdiction with the one of the European Bank for
64 Id. Shihata refers to training programs for judges in business law or the law of commercial
transactions; or providing knowledge on how compliance with contracts can be ensured, or
how courts can perform their work within a reasonable time to help the business community.
65 Id.
66 For a thorough discussion of the conflation of substantive and procedural conceptions of the
rule of law, see Joel M. Ngugi, Searching for the market criterion, SJD Dissertation, Harvard
Law School 2002 (on file with Harvard Law School library). Ngugi contends that a conflation
between a procedural and a substantive conception of the rule of law legitimates economic
reforms that may be emptied out of democratic content. This conflation enables the deploy-
ment of what Ngugi calls a “thick concept” of the rule of law, having both a descriptive and
evaluative property. In Ngugi’s view, the deployment of the rule of law as a thick concept “oper-
ates to justify programmatic [value-laden] reforms while maintaining a standard rhetoric of
procedural necessity that is easily agreed upon politically.” Id. at 139.
67 See Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights, in The World Bank in a Changing
World 97 (1991), pp. 97–109.
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Reconstruction and Development, which specified in its mandate the goal
of establishing market democracies. In contrast, the Bank was not entitled to
condition its lending to the establishment of democratic political processes.68
Setting out these boundaries had the effect of portraying the Bank’s work in
private law reform as a matter of nonpolitical economic expertise.
At this point, it can be appreciated how Shihata swayed back and forth from
a Weberian to a Hayekian version of the rule of law. On the one hand, he argued
for an institutional approach in order to enable the Bank to get involved and
even condition countries’ legal reforms. On the other hand, Shihata promoted
a substantive approach when he asserted the Bank’s authority in designing
specific private law rules, even though he declared the Bank’s role to be merely
establishing an appropriate legal framework. Portraying the Bank’s interven-
tion as merely institutional was further enhanced by declaring other areas
typically thought of as more substantive or political, such as civil and politi-
cal rights, outside its reach.
Thus, we can observe that from the very beginning, the Bank’s relation-
ship to the rule of law idea was characterized by an ambiguity between an
institutional and substantive version, which allowed it a scope of action and
intervention much wider than if it had clearly placed itself only in one or the
other conception.
Expanding the Rule of Law to fight corruption. In 1996, the Bank announced
its determination to begin projects aimed at fighting corruption and thus
join other international efforts. James D. Wolfhenson, then just appointed
president of the Bank, declared that “the international community simply
must deal with the cancer of corruption, because it is a major barrier to
sustainable and equitable development,” thus inaugurating a new area for
the Bank’s involvement.69
In his role as legal advisor, Shihata helped to set up and implement the
Bank’s agenda for combating corruption. While advocating an active role for
the Bank in this area, Shihata was careful to notice once again the Bank’s
prohibition to intervene in political affairs of States. He made clear that fight-
ing corruption was an important part of the Bank’s “governance” agenda and
that, consistent with his previous interpretation of the Articles of Agreement,
it was driven by the estimation of corruption’s negative effects on the appro-
priate use of the Bank’s resources in developing countries. The Bank had an
interest in ensuring that countries use its financial aid for the specific pur-
poses agreed upon in advance and in an efficient manner. Promoting reforms
68 See Shihata, The WB and Governance Issues, supra note 50, at 77, 79, 82, 93–95.
69 See Ibrahim Shihata, Corruption-A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World
Bank, in The World Bank in a Changing World 603 (1991), [hereinafter General Corruption
Review].
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to increase effectiveness of development aid would thus also be consistent
with the Bank’s objectives.70
Although Shihata initially recognized that there was no conclusive empir-
ical evidence on the relationship between lack of corruption and economic
growth, he pointed out an emerging consensus holding that the long-term
effects of corruption in investment climate and peoples’ welfare, weakened
public institutions, and ultimately decreased economic growth.71 Once the
Bank decided to actively participate in combating corruption, Shihata enthu-
siastically noted that the Bank began to produce research showing a strong
correlation between low levels of corruption and income per capita, infant
mortality, and literacy rate. Moreover, the Bank encouraged countries to com-
bat corruption by undertaking a variety of reforms and sought to create the
demand for reforms by getting civil society involved. It established work-
shops, seminars, and training programs to disseminate knowledge and gain
from countries’ experience. Finally, the Bank initiated an internal restructur-
ing in the Bank to monitor procurement and loan disbursement.72
Equally important in Shihata’s justification is a concern with corruption’s
effects on a country’s institutions. In this view, corruption is wrong not only
because it may hinder or retard growth, but because it corrodes societies. It
makes “governance” dysfunctional and ineffective, empowering particular
individuals rather than institutions, and favoring discretion and arbitrary
decision rather than rule following.73 The Bank seems clearly concerned with
corruption as it relates to an exercise of public power that lacks transparency,
tends to be abusive, and is unaccountable. Thus, in this view, corruption not
only produces bad effects for the country’s economic progress, but it is also
morally wrong. It favors the powerful and impinges upon the rights of the
weak and the poor.
Shihata points out that legal scholarship treats corruption as “deviation
(for private gains) from binding rules, the arbitrary exercise of discretionary
powers and the illegitimate use of public resources.”74 Shihata concludes that
corruption has a “devastating effect on the rule of law which . . . is substituted
for by the rule of whoever has the influence or the ability and willingness
to pay.”75 Thus, building the rule of law becomes a strategy to manage and
reduce corruption.
70 See General Corruption Review, supra note 69, at 626–630.
71 Id. at 604–605.
72 See Ibrahim Shihata, Postscript of chapter eighteen, in 3 The World Bank in a Changing World
641 (2000).
73 The Bank embraced the agenda for fighting corruption to ensure an effective state, one that
could reinvigorate the market reforms promoted in the neoliberal period, particularly policies
of free-trade, market deregulation and privatization of state-owned enterprises and increase
their likelihood of success. See World Development Report 1997 – The State in a Changing
World, 8 (World Bank 1997).
74 Corruption General Review, supra note 69, at 606.
75 Id. at 607.
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High among the policies that countries can implement to curb corrup-
tion are legal reforms in civil service, criminal law, administrative law, and
judicial reform. Changes would aim at establishing a meritocracy in the
bureaucracy, guaranteeing transparency in public administration, ensur-
ing monitoring of government procurement processes, reducing red-tape,
and curbing arbitrariness and discretion in administrative and judicial
decisions.
Successful reforms will ensure that in Dicey’s terms, “no man is above the
law,” emphasizing the need for government officials to act in accordance with
previously established and publicized laws. The judiciary plays a key role in
this strategy. By ensuring that public officials will be held individually respon-
sible for their actions, these projects aim at creating checks to government
discretion and arbitrary power.76 Beyond what economic effects the reduc-
tion of corruption may bring about, the institutional changes will make for
a better, more transparent, accountable and, in the end, more democratic
type of government. Therefore, the Bank’s rationale for fighting corruption
upholds an institutional version of the rule of law that is not merely instru-
mental but also intrinsic.
Reinterpreting the Rule of Law to reduce poverty and enhance peoples’ capa-
bilities. The Comprehensive Development Framework sets out a role for each
of the actors of development (government, private sector, civil society, devel-
opment agencies) and proposes a framework for coordinating their efforts.
The program keeps the stress on sequencing and phasing of reforms as well
as on local ownership, while preserving the role of the private sector as the
main engine for development. In this holistic approach to development of
the CDF, the focus of legal and judicial reform projects has moved beyond
economic growth, also promoting human rights to achieve sustainable and
equitable development. In the struggle against poverty, these projects empha-
size access to justice as well as empowerment, ownership, and security for
the most vulnerable groups, with particular emphasis on the poor, women,
and children. This agenda relies on a substantive and intrinsic (Sen-based)
conception of the rule of law.
The reform strategy has broadened to acknowledge an important role for
the state in regulating the market. The task becomes one of delimiting the
appropriate regulation to promote and encourage business activity. The goal
is to generate a market-friendly and enterprise-led growth while reducing
poverty and helping people improve their quality of life.77 In addition, the
Bank has argued that “a well functioning legal and judicial system is critical
76 See Ibrahim Shihata, Role of the Judiciary in the Prevention and Control of Corruption, 3 The
World Bank in a Changing World 277 (2001).
77 For a strategy that reflects this goal, see Private Sector Development Strategy-Directions
for the World Bank Group, The World Bank (April 9, 2002). http://rru.worldbank.org/doc-
uments/PSDStrategy-April%209.pdf.
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both as an end in itself [intrinsic] as well as a means to facilitate and leverage
the achievement of other development objectives [instrumental].”78
Multiple Rule of Law conceptions at play. Throughout these three periods,
the policy models of the World Bank signal a shift of emphasis on the rule
of law discourse from an instrumental conception (in both its institutional
and substantive versions) to an intrinsic one. All four versions of the rule of
law seem to converge in a hodge-podge articulation as exemplified in current
usage of the term in World Bank reports:
The rule of law is essential to equitable economic development and sustain-
able poverty reduction. Weak legal and judicial systems undermine the fight
against poverty on many fronts: they divert investment to markets with more
predictable rule-based environments, deprive important sectors of the use of
productive assets, and mute the voice of citizens in the decision-making pro-
cess. Vulnerable individuals, including women and children, are unprotected
from violence and other forms of abuse that exacerbate inequalities. Ineffectual
enforcement of laws engenders environmental degradation, corruption, money
laundering, and other problems that burden people and economies around the
world.79
These conceptions are overlapping but there are also tensions and contra-
dictions between them. It seems hard that they could all be advanced simul-
taneously. In the following section, I will argue that, despite the promising
inclusion of an intrinsic rule of law conception, there seems to be a simulta-
neous use of all rule of law conceptions that works as a shield. By advocating
several conceptions at once, it becomes easier to justify the goals of any
given project. Criticism to any one of the conceptions can be deflected by
alternating between the purposes of the different conceptions at play. Look-
ing at how projects of legal and judicial reform are justified in practice will
help to clarify how the rule of law conceptions are deployed and with what
purposes.
A look at its official rhetoric enables one to see that the Bank has moved
a long way from the initial justification to participate in the reform of legal
78 See Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform, supra note 45, at 2. This shift finds support in the
work of Amartya Sen, who explicitly responded to the question of “What is the role of legal and
judicial reform in the development process?” in an address to the Bank. See Sen, supra note 40.
Legal’s most recent legal reform strategy explicitly recognizes a link between poverty reduction
and human rights, based on the principle that freedom from poverty is an essential element of
development. Moreover, it confirms the CDF’s holistic approach proposing that the protection
of economic, social, and cultural human rights is an essential element of sustainable and equi-
table development. See Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions, Legal Vice Presidency,
The World Bank (2003) http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/GreyBookFinal2003.pdf [here-
inafter Strategic Directions] at 46.
79 World Bank Annual Report, 2002. p.77 (emphasis added).
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and judicial systems around the world. Contrast Shihata’s initial position and
his efforts to justify the Bank’s involvement in these projects with the Bank’s
current position. In his reinterpretation of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement,
Shihata tried hard to draw a distinction between economics and politics. The
prohibition from intervening in countries’ political affairs was interpreted
then as meaning a more overt involvement with countries’ type of govern-
ment and the governments’ decision-making processes. Today, the Bank’s
reports speak, evaluate, and propose reforms about the quality of govern-
ment, the level of participation of citizens in the country’s decision-making
processes, the protection of individuals’ rights against abuse of power, the
monitoring and control of public officials, and an increasing list of subjects
that seem to take us back full circle to the overt political interventions that
the Bank’s legal advisor had initially marked out as outside the Bank’s man-
date. This doesn’t mean that the Bank’s work on legal and judicial reform
did not have strong political implications earlier. But the illusion of main-
taining an apolitical stance, still very much part of the Bank’s discourse, has
become ever more difficult to sustain. The irony is that while the rule of law
was supposed to provide a justification for the Bank’s apolitical involvement
in countries’ reform, it has expanded to the point of making the apolitical
pretension untenable.
THE PRACTICE OF REFORMING COURTS AND LAWS
Having these multiple conceptions of the ROL in mind I will move now from
the realm of the rhetoric to the practice field. The question that I seek to
answer is why projects of legal and judicial reform are still appealing and
continue to be recommended and provided by groups in the Bank despite
a number of important critiques and unfavorable evidence. To answer this
question I explore the practice of Bank groups in introducing and justify-
ing legal and judicial reform projects as well as in evaluating their work and
responding to critiques. To engage in this analysis I make use of all the ele-
ments laid down and developed so far.
First, I bring back the idea of the rule of law as a hodge-podge, comprising
not of one but four conceptions that are different and often conflicting. Sec-
ond, I identify the use of these multiple conceptions in the Bank’s rhetoric
and look at how these conceptions coexist and are used simultaneously. In
this section, I introduce an institutional analysis of the Bank, paying special
attention to four groups that have been crucial in promoting and carrying
out the transformation of developing countries’ legal and judicial systems.
Lastly, the analysis considers the relations between the Bank and developing
countries, looking at the mechanisms that tend to perpetuate these projects
regardless of their substantive merits.
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Disaggregating the World Bank
This analysis builds upon my experience while working in the World Bank
during the summer of 2003, where I strove to capture the understandings of
the rule of law under which the Bank operated. I started this project by making
a preliminary map of the different groups working on issues related to rule
of law reform and identifying what their projects consist of.80 Some people
at the Bank reacted by saying that my map was too neat and I needed to add
more chaos and definitely more subdivisions. The deeper I got into the study
of the various Bank units engaged in rule of law projects and their respective
understandings of what the concept entailed, the more this experience of
fragmentation and inconsistency intensified.81
I think that the Bank’s position, discourse, and reform agenda regarding the
role of law in economic development can be better grasped if we understand it
as the product of the interaction and even struggle between different groups
within the institution. This analysis will help to clarify that groups within
the World Bank have subscribed to different conceptions of the rule of law at
different points in time. Before analyzing the dynamics between these groups,
I explore the connection between the particular versions of the rule of law
that the groups uphold and the specific projects that they work on.
The Legal Department. The Legal and Judicial Reform group of the Legal
Vice Presidency,82 commonly referred to as “Legal,” is the Bank’s most visible
department in the business of reforming laws and courts. This group was
created in the early 1990s and gave the Legal Vice Presidency direct partici-
pation in the operative part of these projects, joining other divisions in the
Bank already working on reforming courts. To a great extent, for the outside
80 I use the word “groups” in this chapter to refer to the various units or divisions in the World
Bank working on projects of legal and judicial reform. It should not be confused with the five
“World Bank Groups,” consisting of IDRB, IDA, IFC, MIGA and ICSID.
81 This analysis is by no means exhaustive. Trying to simplify the extremely complex structure of
the Bank comes at the risk of leaving out groups doing relevant work in this area. However, the
groups under analysis are undoubtedly important actors in the Bank and they merit discussion
as driving forces within the institution. Other groups working in aspects that relate to legal and
judicial reform include the International Law and Environment in the Legal Vice Presidency,
and Gender and Civil Society in the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management sector.
82 The Legal Vice-Presidency (LGVP) operates as one integrated unit, but is composed of eight
thematic practice groups: 1) Co-financing and Project Finance, 2) Corporate Finance, 3) Institu-
tional Administration, 4) Environment and International Law, 5) Private Sector, Infrastructure
and Finance, 6) Legal and Judicial Reform, 7) Policy and Institutional Affairs, and 8) Procure-
ment and Consultant Services, and five regional practice groups: 1) Africa, 2) East Asia and
Pacific, 3) Europe and Central Asia, 4) Latin America and the Caribbean, and 5) Middle East,
North Africa and South Asia. The Law and Justice Group, an umbrella that includes three
groups: 1) Legal and Judicial Reform, 2) Environment and International Law, and 3) Private
Sector, Infrastructure, and Finance, has prepared the latest publications of the Legal Vice Pres-
idency concerning legal and judicial reform, assessing and redefining the work of the Bank in
this area.
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observer Legal represents the “official” position of the Bank’s work in this area
through its publications. The group serves two main functions. On one hand
it is involved in the design and implementation of a number of projects.83
On the other hand, it gathers and publishes information about all legal and
judicial reform projects, including those carried out by other units.84
Public Sector Unit. The Public Sector Unit (Public Sector) is one of the con-
stituent parts of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management sector
(PREM).85 This group jump-started court reform projects in the early 1990s
and it has designed and implemented a substantial part of the Bank’s judicial
reform projects.86 Public Sector has focused on reforming countries’ judicia-
ries to provide the institutional framework assumed necessary for economic
development to thrive. Public Sector and Legal are the main contenders for
management of judicial reform projects and are engaged in an ongoing battle
for resources.
Private Sector Development Group. This group was established in 1988 in
the context of the Bank’s advocacy of reducing the role of the State in the
economy.87 At one with the prevailing free-market wisdom and an aversion
to all things public of that time, the private sector was forecasted to be the
most promising area of development assistance. More recently, the Private
Sector Development Group (Private Sector) has been converted into a vice
presidency, effectively creating a network of units working on issues of privati-
zation and corporate finance. Private Sector is involved in some operational
work designing laws for borrowing countries in the fields of corporations,
finance, bankruptcy, and other related areas aiming to create a favorable
“investment climate” where businesses can thrive.88
83 The group’s webpage can be accessed at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/. Legal
and judicial indicators can be found at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/database/Justice/
default.htm. See also Strategic Directions, supra note 78, and Observations, Experiences, and
Approach, supra note 1.
84 The group’s publications are accessible at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/public-
ations.html.
85 PREM is a network Vice Presidency, which means that there is a PREM unit in each of the Bank’s
five regions plus an anchor unit.
86 Apart from judicial reform, the Public Sector unit undertakes projects of public expenditure
analysis and management, tax policy and administration, civil service and administrative
reform, decentralization, e-government, public enterprises, technical assistance and capacity
building. I will focus on the work of Public Sector of the Latin American region, which has been
perhaps the most active in judicial reform projects. The number of these projects is remark-
able considering that the Inter-American Development Bank has made judicial reform one
of its central reform projects too. See Christina Biebesheimer and J. Mark Payne, IDB Experi-
ence in Justice Reform-Lessons Learned and Elements for Policy Formulation, Inter-American
Development Bank (2001), http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/sgc-IDBExperiences-E.pdf.
87 See generally, Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and Private Sector Development – A Legal
Perspective, in 1 The World Bank in a Changing World 203 (1991).
88 See Knowledge Services for Private Sector Development at http://rru.worldbank.org/.
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Within the Private Sector and not directly involved in operations, the Rapid
Response Unit (“Rapid Response”) has clearly articulated a program for law
reform, seeking to establish appropriate regulation for economic develop-
ment. Dubbed the “Doing Business” report,89 this project claims it has found
out which legal rules promote growth and recommends their adoption to
developing countries as best practices for business.90 Rapid often presents
itself as a sort of 911 for policymakers in distress. Among other online services
and information available, experts provide “best practice public policy advice
for private sector led growth” and prompt customized assistance for the “alle-
viation” of the private sector. “Do you need customized policy advice on
investment climate? Click here.”91
89 This group’s interactive webpage is http://www.doingbusiness.org/ where the “Doing Busi-
ness” projects of 2004, 2005 and 2006 can be accessed.
90 This group is closely connected with the “legal origins” scholarly project doing comparative
studies of how certain legal systems are more conducive to efficient outcomes than others.
The “legal origins” theorists consist of a group of leading economists working in the fields
of behavioral finance, financial markets, corporate finance, and corporate governance. Mak-
ing use of legal history and comparative law, these scholars have turned to “legal systems”
for an explanation of countries’ regulatory divergence and subsequent social and economic
outcomes. Together, these scholars have written an already recognizable body of literature in
comparative economics that informs the “Doing Business” reports. The head of the project in
the World Bank is Simeon Djankov. The main academic figure is Harvard economics professor
Andrei Shleifer, and the team includes Oliver Hart, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, and Rafael La
Porta, among others.
Proponents of the “legal origins” theory first advanced in the field of corporate finance (Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106
Journal of Political Economy 1113–1155, 1998) claim that legal tradition explains differences
in countries’ regulation. Adopting the conventional categorization which groups countries’
legal systems into “legal families”, proponents of this theory argue that regulation in common
law countries is economically more efficient and leads to better growth results than in civil
law countries (Edward Glaeser, and Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 1193–1229, 2002).
These theorists are prolific and have produced a vast literature, rapidly expanding from
the field of corporate finance to other areas of regulation like administrative law (Simeon
Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de- Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, The Regulation
of Entry, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1–37, 2002, and Rafael La Porta, Floren-
cio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, The Quality of Government, 15
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 222–279, 1999); bankruptcy (Simeon Djankov,
Oliver Hart, Tatiana Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer, The Efficiency of Bankruptcy, Working Paper.
Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 2003); labor and employ-
ment (Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei
Shleifer, The Regulation of Labor, Working Paper 9756, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, Mass., 2003); and civil procedure (Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Courts, 118 Quarterly Journal of Economics 342–
387, 2003; and Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, Remedies in Credit
Markets, Working Paper. Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.,
2003).
91 http://rru.worldbank.org/ (as seen on December 2003). Since then, Rapid Response has
nuanced its marketing to offer “customized policy research on business environment issues,”
which it now provides for free at http://rru.worldbank.org/AskQuestion/.
P1: OyK
0521860210c07 CUNY432/Trubek Printer: cupusbw 0 521 86021 0 June 10, 2006 12:26
The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise 281
TABLE 2. World Bank Groups’ Use of Multiple Rule of Law Conceptions
Degree of differentiation of legal norms
(from other systems like morals-politics)
Institutional Substantive
Degree of relative Instrumental Legal Rapid Response Unit
value against other Public Sector [Friedrich Hayek]
competing [Max Weber]
considerations







World Bank Institute. This group constitutes the major research center of
the Bank. The World Bank Institute (WBI) does not participate in the opera-
tional work of legal and judicial reform projects but its research agenda has
made it an important player in the area. Since 1996, WBI has published the
“Governance Indicators,” which report on the “good governance” of most
countries, claiming to measure the institutional framework of both a coun-
try’s government and market. This group defines governance broadly as “the
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.” It has
unbundled governance into three parts: 1) the process by which governments
are selected, monitored, and replaced, 2) the capacity of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies effectively, and 3) the respect of
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions. Through the publication of its indicators, WBI has become the
authority on measuring governance around the world.92 In addition, WBI
has invested resources in training programs, setting up regional and country
courses for judges, advancing the idea that the judiciary is a fundamental
actor in curbing corruption, and improving good governance.
Table 2 table situates the four groups under analysis and the conceptions
of the rule of law that they more frequently invoke in their projects.
Judicial and legal reform projects
Looking at how these multiple rule of law conceptions are deployed by groups
in the Bank in projects of legal and judicial reform can help us answer the
92 See http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/; For the most recent paper see
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance
Indicators for 1996–2004, (The World Bank, May 2005) http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/
governance/pdf/GovMatters˙IV˙main.pdf The indicators are interactive and allow the user
to compare indicators across countries as well as overall rates of particular countries across
regions.
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puzzle of why these projects remain so appealing regardless of scant results
and continued critiques. In my view, the rule of law rhetoric has facilitated the
problematic continuation of projects and has further decreased the demands
for delivering the economic growth originally promised. The constant prac-
tice of slippage between these ROL conceptions and the way they are deployed
by the units working on these projects has two effects. First, it allows poli-
cymakers to be unclear about what they mean when they invoke the ROL.
Second, it allows policymakers to not take seriously the critiques of their
projects or the evidence of disappointing results by engaging in a practice of
“goal-post-shifting.” When pressed by a critique of the premises with which
they introduced their projects, they turn to a multiplicity of other objectives
or aspirations that their projects are also supposed to pursue in relation to
different conceptions of the ROL. I argue that this practice enables policy-
makers to disregard important critiques of their projects’ premises and of
unfavorable results. Finally, this slippage encourages a continued confusion
among different groups that may have very different agendas. I will dis-
cuss what I consider to be other negative effects of this dynamic, namely
lack of transparency, waste of resources, and justification for opportunistic
behavior.
Judicial reform. I will begin with an example of how I think this practice
works in analyzing projects of judicial reform, of which Public Sector Unit
and Legal are in charge. These projects started with the premise that an inde-
pendent and effective judiciary is a necessary precondition for economic
development.93 This premise became a marching tune and was included
in these groups’ reports and academic papers justifying their projects. It
was argued that merely enacting property and contract laws would not suf-
fice to attract investment unless independent and effective courts enforced
them. Effective courts were in charge of setting in motion the private sec-
tor. The assumption was that courts would ensure calculability and pre-
dictability of economic transactions by effectively enforcing contracts and
acting independently to prevent governments’ impingement on property
rights.
The first judicial reform project of the Bank was delivered as a “technical
assistance loan” to Venezuela in 1992. Gradually, the scope of these projects
expanded to include aspects related to judicial independence, judicial train-
ing, court administration and case management, control of corruption,
appointment of judges, criminal justice, and government accountability.94
93 This argument is clearly stated by Maria Dakolias, the director of the Legal and Judicial Reform
group, in A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36 Va.J. Int 167
(1995–1996).
94 See Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform, supra note 45, at 3–5.
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However, some tensions became apparent and the premises of these
projects were subject to important objections. First, it was noted that a formal
regime of property rights and contract enforcement, which the courts were
deemed to make effective, is not necessarily high in the considerations of
investors when deciding where to invest. Investors and business actors are
generally driven by returns, and they often rely on informal mechanisms of
enforcement where reputation and expectations of future transactions sub-
stitute for formal mechanisms to ensure compliance.95
Second, there is evidence that entrepreneurs are not all that concerned with
the effectiveness of judiciaries in the countries they invest. Investors’ primary
interest is returns, not effective courts. A 1993 survey of sixty-eight business
enterprises in Ecuador, conducted by Legal itself, to determine the con-
straints of private sector development found that an effective judicial system
came sixth in the list, after political instability, inflation and price instability,
lack of skilled labor, lack of infrastructure, and high level of taxation.96
Imagine investors considering business in China; it isn’t hard to visualize
that the size of the market and profit opportunities, not the structure of its
legal and judicial system, will carry the day in investors’ decisions. In mid-size
economies like Brazil and Mexico, large domestic markets are a major draw
for both national and foreign investors. In the case of Mexico, proximity to
the United States and a free-trade agreement that strongly protects investors
by bypassing – not making more effective – national courts, are also major
factors in attracting investment. Indeed, the legal and judicial systems of these
countries could probably be less effective than they currently are without
affecting entrepreneurs’ interest to invest.97
The legal system could represent a marginal advantage for very small coun-
tries having little else to offer. Creating market-friendly legal enclaves of weak
consumer protection, minimum labor, and employment rights or low stan-
dards of environmental protection could represent an attraction for investors.
But more attractive may be special concessions to entrepreneurs in the usual
form of tax exemptions, public services, and bureaucratic ease. In neither
case, however, does judicial reform come high in the list.
95 For a classic argument of business reliance on informal mechanisms see Stewart Maculay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 American Sociolog-
ical Review 55 (1963). For an argument on investor’s disregard for the institutional
settings often deemed required for investment see John Hewko, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, Does the Rule of Law Matter? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April
2002). http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=952&prog
=zgp&proj=zdrl,zted
96 See World Bank, No. 127777-EC, Ecuador: Judicial Sector Assessment 1 (1994), cited in Dakolias,
supra note 93 at 169.
97 These examples are taken from Linn Hammergren, Notes on the Rule of Law and Economic
Development p.5, paper presented at Harvard Conference on Rule of Law and Economic Devel-
opment, April 2002, (on file with the author).
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Third, it was also noted that investors usually don’t solve their disputes in
courts. They frequently solve their disputes through arbitration or strive to
reach a settlement. But even if entrepreneurs do go to courts, they generally
had access to elite lawyers who knew the system well and had high chances
of succeeding. Foreign investors, for instance, can generally find their way in
the domestic legal system through high-profile legal assistance that is incor-
porated in the business cost. Furthermore, judicial reforms were supposed to
create incentives for banks and other important creditors that already have
an advantage in a judicial system where they are repeat players, know the
judicial personnel, have an opportunity to influence the interpretation of the
law over time, have the possibility to choose their best cases, negotiate others,
and generally build a practice in a specific area.98
Finally, good legal systems do not guarantee investment. In Costa Rica,
for example, constitutional protections, proworker and prolandless courts
provide a clear, predictable, and fairly enforced legal framework but create
problems for certain investments.99
Beyond the problems posed by the assumptions, there were also problems
of implementation. The standard judicial reform project ranging from 2.5
(Yemen) to 58 (Russia) million dollars carried out by Legal or Public Sec-
tor, included building new courtrooms, implementing technology for court
administration and case management, and training judges. There was prac-
tically no diagnosis on the particular conditions of the judicial system of the
country in question and on why it was necessary to reform. What were the
problems that needed solution, for what purposes, and with what strategy?
There was simply no empirical study of how the system worked and what the
red lights that needed change were. Consequently, little attention was paid to
the impact of the projects on the effectiveness of judicial processes or their
ultimate economic impact. This lack of diagnosis usually transpired to the
evaluation of these programs. A successful project would report that infra-
structure, technology, and training had been effectively introduced, but there
were hardly other systematic criteria against which to evaluate the impact of
these projects.
When reforms aimed at increasing the effectiveness of adjudication,
they focused on decreasing backlogs and reducing the time of disposition
and enforcement.100 Critiques highlighted the lack of empirical research
carried out to identify the causes of the problems, (backlogs, delays,
98 For a seminal account of this phenomenon see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law and Society Review 95 (1974).
99 See Linn Hammergren, supra note 97 p.6.
100 Maria Dakolias, Court Performance Around the World: A Comparative Perspective, 2 Yale
H.R. & Dev. L.J. 87 (1999) and Edgardo Buscaglia and Maria Dakolias, Comparative Inter-
national Study of Court Performance Indicators, The World Bank (1999) http://www4.
worldbank.org/legal/publications/CourtIndicators-72.pdf.
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nonenforcement) or to design the most effective strategy to address them.
The results of these projects remained barely open to evaluation on the basis
of the identification of a problem, or on the depth of a program of action and
concrete and measurable expectations. Moreover, the few empirical studies
sponsored by the Bank found that much of the “conventional wisdom” that
had guided reforms was unwarranted.101
The results of judicial reform projects are of course hard to measure, espe-
cially if the projects provided no yardstick to monitor and assess performance.
But there has been no clear empirical evidence of their success in spurring
economic growth. Despite a variety of studies making a case for correlation,
the relation of causality between effective courts and economic development,
and its direction, is still highly contested. Indeed, economies in countries
that reformed their judiciaries in the last two decades have not fared well and
many of them are doing worse than before. Moreover, scholars have shown
that countries that for decades experienced high rates of growth like Japan,
Korea, Taiwan, and China, did not have a judicial system as the ideal type
promoted by groups in the Bank.102
101 A series of recent World Bank studies on “court uses and court users” in five Latin American
countries show how much of the “conventional wisdom” about the problems of judi-
ciaries and why reform is necessary rests on no empirical support and is often plainly
wrong. This is the conventional wisdom that has guided the Bank for most of its involve-
ment in the sector. See Linn Hammergren, Uses of Empirical Research in Refocusing Judi-
cial Reforms: Lessons from Five Countries, PREM, and The World Bank 2003 (http://www1.
worldbank.org/prem/PREMNotes/premnote65.pdf). In an empirical research of summary
debt-collection proceedings in Mexico City, analysts found that the users and size of the claims
were small to medium and while firms constituted barely more than half of the plaintiffs, most
defendants were individuals. This was not a picture of disputes between major economic actors
but of minor debts incurred for consumption or small investments. Furthermore, the over-
whelming majority of judgments was in favor of the plaintiff (creditor), showing no pro-debtor
bias either in the procedural norms or the judges’ attitudes. Delays were overtly exaggerated
by experts, and when delays occurred, plaintiffs’ lawyers and bailiffs rather than judges and
combative defendants seemed to be far more responsible. Findings showed a high rate of aban-
donment due to multiple factors such as successful out of court negotiations by the parties,
the plaintiff’s lack of interest in materializing the claim (filing to declare a tax), the impossi-
bility of recuperating a debt (insolvent debtor, loans granted on creditors’ poor judgment in
lending decisions or troubles in identifying assets to seize) or disloyal agents (the bailiff or the
plaintiff’s attorney). Many of these problems were extra-judicial in origin and no amount of
standard judicial reforms, as suggested by the 1996 reform undertaken in Mexico to accelerate
proceedings, will solve them. Others were clearly judicial problems (the bailiff’s power over
the proceedings, procedural complications when dealing with multiple jurisdictions, and the
execution phase) that needed well-targeted reforms to give judges a more active role in the
proceedings and simplify coordination between different jurisdictions. See Report No. 22635-
ME, The Juicio Ejecutivo Mercantil in the Federal District Courts of Mexico, The World Bank
(2002).
102 See Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy, Carnegie Endowment Work-
ing Paper, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project # 30, September 2002,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1063; John Ohne-
sorge, supra note 3; William Alford, The More Law, the More . . . ? Measuring Legal Reform in
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Faced with these difficulties, judicial reformers can confidently claim that
projects of reforming courts seek now also other objectives. Legal and Public
Sector make reference to what seems a Senian conception of the ROL, arguing
that these projects seek to empower vulnerable groups in society by giving
them access to justice and legal aid. These groups also refer to a Diceyan con-
ception of the ROL, claiming that establishing an independent and effective
judiciary is an essential element in preventing and prosecuting corruption.
In this view, independent courts that review the executive’s actions ensure
the prevention of arbitrary government.
There is no doubt that using the legal system to distribute resources in
a way that empowers the most vulnerable groups in society and enhances
their capabilities to pursue the life they have a reason to live is a worthwhile
project. My point is not that these groups should remain within the bound-
aries of a growth-based approach to development. However, the confused
use of a Weberian and a Senian conception cancels out a discussion of the
expectations of both. On the one hand, Legal and Public Sector avoid a dis-
cussion on the growth effects by reference to Sen. And on the other, they thin
out Sen’s social vision of development by equating it with the formal and
institutional characteristics of the legal system. From this perspective, when
judicial reforms are taking place, the poor are being empowered.
When their projects are criticized because of their lack of diagnosis and
strategy, Legal and Public Sector respond they have a strategy, which is involv-
ing all stakeholders and promoting ownership of the project. This may be
desirable for increasing participation but does not substitute for having an
idea of what is wrong with a judicial system, why it is desirable to spend
resources there rather than elsewhere, and how these projects will achieve
the goals they seek.
Legal reform. Let’s take as a second example projects of legal reform such as
formalization of property rights seeking to establish a regime of clear, secure,
and registered title.103 The institutional actors involved in these projects have
been the private sector development and the legal and judicial reform group.
the People’s Republic of China, in How Far Across the River? Chinese Policy Reform in the
Chinese World, (eds. N.C. Hope, D.T. Yang, and M.Y. Li, Stanford University Press, 2003).
103 The work of Douglas North, in particular, had a strong impact on the way development policy-
makers began to think about law and legal rules as institutional foundations for a market
economy. North’s historical work advanced the argument that legal institutions that securely
enforced property rights were favorable for economic efficiency and growth. Divergence from
this pattern could be attributed to special interest groups and transaction costs that explained
the prevalence of inefficient property rights and lack of economic growth. It is not difficult to
imagine the enthusiasm with which international development organizations, like the World
Bank, embraced North’s theory of institutional change. Changing developing countries’ insti-
tutions, and primarily legal systems, could break the institutional path dependence respon-
sible for countries’ economic stagnation and pave the way to more efficient markets. See
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Starting from a Hayekian conception of the ROL announcing that clear and
secure property rights were the foundation of a market economy that would
lead to growth, these units have recently incorporated a Senian conception
that advocates the enhancement of peoples’ capabilities as justification of
their projects.104
Projects of formalization of property rights were implemented in several
developing countries, seeking to unleash the dormant capital potential. The
premise was that as long as assets remained in the informal sector, they con-
stituted a “dead capital” that could not be used productively because no one
had clear title to them. Potential entrepreneurs could not use their assets as
collateral to obtain credit and could not predict the enforcement of the return
on their productive use.105 Hernando de Soto has been the main campaigner
of titling projects aiming to bring assets into the formal sector and his work
has been optimistically received by international development agencies and
other development scholars.
The premises of these projects, however, raise a number of important objec-
tions.106 In informal settings, as contextual legal analysis of customary norms
has shown, people often have clear ideas about what they can or cannot do
without formalized legal entitlements. Legal and economic scholarship has
shed light on social cooperation and efficient markets that do not rely on
formal entitlements or formal mechanisms of enforcement.107 That these
informal mechanisms have been found to be prominent in business circles
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(1990).
104 See Doing Business in 2005, Removing Obstacles to Growth 33–40 (The World Bank,
2004) http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/DoingBusiness2005.PDF (arguing that weak
property rights exclude the poor from doing business). See Land Policies for Growth and
Poverty Reduction, The World Bank, 2003 (arguing that securing land rights of the poor and
reducing barriers to title transactions can trigger important social and economic benefits,
including empowerment of women and other marginalized people, as well as increased pri-
vate investment, and more rapid economic growth). See The World Development Report
2006: Equity and Development, The World Bank, 2005 (arguing that inequality of opportu-
nity weakens prospects for overall prosperity and economic growth. To reduce poverty more
effectively the report recommends ensuring more equitable access by the poor to secure land
rights, along with health care, education, jobs, and capital. It also appeals for greater equality
of access to political freedoms and for improving access by the poor to justice systems and
infrastructure.)
105 See generally Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital (2000) and id. The Other Path: The
invisible revolution in the Third World (1990).
106 My discussion in this section builds on David Kennedy’s Laws and Developments, in Contem-
plating Complexity: Law and Development in the 21st Century (Amanda Perry and John
Hatchard eds., 2003).
107 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991); Avner
Greif, Contracting, Enforcement, and Efficiency: Economics Beyond the Law, in Michael Bruno
and Boris Pleskovic, eds., Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1996
Washington, D.C., World Bank.
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should cast some doubt on the need of formalizing entitlements to stimulate
investment and business transactions.108 Moreover, the prevalence of credit
markets in informal property rights settings may help asses the extent to
which formalization holds the key to an increase in capital investment.
Assuming that formalization was needed to clarify property rights, their
efficient use does not require a specific set of substantively private enti-
tlements.109 Economists have shown the striking growth results of pro-
grams combining private and public entitlements, like the “shareholding-
cooperative system” (SCS) in China.110
But even if the choice is a regime of private property rights, legal scholars
have long made us aware that property is not a unified ownership conception
but rather a bundle of rights, comprised of a multiplicity of entitlements that
define relationships of people with one another.111 As legal historians have
shown, regimes of property rights both in common law and civil law systems
did not develop out of a simple unified ownership conception but rather out
of a multiplicity of entitlements subject to easements and exceptions.112
There is the additional problem that a regime of private property rights
would not be self-realizable. As it becomes operative, parties will become
aware that the property law scheme, applicable to their relations, contains
gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities that need to be filled, resolved, and clarified.
To the extent that parties are unable to resolve their disputes and in the event
that they resort to courts, it will become clear to them that resolution and
enforcement of disputes cannot be reached simply by reference to rights.113
The working out of these decisions will importantly affect this new property
rights regime and transform parties’ entitlements and their power vis-a`-vis
one another.114
108 See Stewart Maculay, supra note 95; Id. The Impact of Contract Law on the Economy: Less Than
Meets the Eye?, Paper given at a Conference on Law and Modernization, Lima, Peru, July, 1994.
109 See Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman, Are property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra
L. Rev. 711 (1980), and Joel Ngugi, supra note 3.
110 See Dani Rodrik, After Neoliberalism, What? (June 2002) available at http://ksghome.
harvard.edu/.drodrik.academic.ksg/After%20Neoliberalism.pdf (arguing that Chinese institu-
tional innovations like the household responsibility system, the township and village enter-
prises, and the two-track pricing regime succeeded in providing effective property rights despite
the lack of private property rights); Zhiyuan Cui, Wither China? The Discourse on Property
Rights in the Chinese Reform Context, 16 Social Text 55 (1998).
111 For a canonical exposition see Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied to Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale Law Journal 28 (1913).
112 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780–1860; Thomas Grey, The
Disintegration of Property, Nomos xxii: Property 69–86 (1980); Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud
in Property Law 40 Stanford L. Rev. 577 (1988).
113 See Hohfeld, supra note 111; Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935); Duncan Kennedy, supra, note 14.
114 See Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller, Property Rights And Land Conflict:
A Comparison Of Settlement Of The U.S. Western And Brazilian Amazon Frontiers, in Latin
America and the World Economy Since 1800, (eds. John H. Coatsworth and Alan M. Taylor,
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It turns out to be impossible to determine in the abstract what combination
of property rights entitlements would lead to more efficient outcomes. For
instance, would it be better to maximize the freedom of possessors to do as
they please at the expense of their neighbors’ security? Or rather, would it be
better to maximize the security of possessors from neighbors’ free exercise
of power? The first one would arguably reduce protection; the second would
reduce flexibility in the ways parties can relate to one another. Moreover, we
would need evidence that a one-time increase in efficiency as a result of a
given arrangement of legal entitlements would generate growth, rather than
just another equilibrium level.115
A scheme of formalization of land title in Peru could enable a squatter
with new title to exclude the trespasser. But we need an explanation of why
assets in the hand of the title holder, rather than the reverse, would yield
the more efficient outcome that would lead to growth. So, it becomes clear
that attention to context is crucial. But projects of formalization generally
disregarded the need for this type of contextual analysis by assuming that
what was needed was simply clear and secure property rights.
By accounts of outside critiques and analysts within the Bank, titling pro-
grams aimed at bringing assets into the formal sector have not had the impact
that reformers hoped for. But the objections mentioned are rarely addressed.
Departing from a Hayekian ROL perspective, programs of formalization of
property rights seem to have incorporated a version of Sen’s vision for empow-
ering the poor, women, and other vulnerable groups.116 A recent report advo-
cated by the “Doing Business” project in the private sector predicts that titling
will help the poor because weak property rights exclude the poor from doing
business and prevent them from higher income levels.117 But the study has
stayed remote from a contextual analysis of the kind that is needed by rely-
ing on the incorporation of best practices of other regulatory areas that are
supposed to keep titled assets from falling back in the informal sector.118
1998) p. 55–84 (providing a historical example of how land titling policies in the U.S. and Brazil
gave rise to important disputes between different groups of claimants with a right to the land.
It was not merely the formal property rights regime but its interplay with parties’ asymmetrical
power and the states’ enforcement in favor of one or the other that ultimately determined the
land distribution).
115 For an explanation of this type of dynamic efficiency see Gunnar Myrdal, An Approach to the
Asian Drama, 1843, Appendix 1 (1970); See also Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from
the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and
the Law (P. Newman ed. 1998).
116 See Land Policies for Growth and The World Development Report 2006, supra note 104.
117 See Doing Business in 2005, supra note 104.
118 It should be noted that development policymakers at the Bank adopted North’s theory only
partially. What was taken from North’s theory of institutional change was the proposition that
formal legal institutions, notably a system of clear and secure property rights and contracts,
were generally conducive to efficient markets and economic growth. However, this wisdom
missed one of North’s most important contributions, namely a theory of institutional change
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I started this section by stating that this practice came at a high cost, namely
lack of transparency, waste of resources, and justification for opportunistic
behavior. This is a puzzle: I take people at the Bank to be serious about their
commitment to improving life conditions in developing countries and I can
attest to the professionalism with which they do their work. In my view, the
explanation is twofold. On one hand, the answer lies on the conceptual con-
fusion about the ROL. On the other hand, it rests on the internal dynamics
between units in the Bank and the relationship between the Bank and its
borrowing countries. These are both aspects of the ROL agenda within the
Bank that we are still a long way from fully understanding. I believe, however,
that this type of inquiry is urgently needed. I propose some lines of thought
here that would hopefully lead to further research.
Internal dynamics within the World Bank
The dynamics among the Bank divisions reflect the structural incentives
that foster continuation of these projects and help explain the success in
portraying legal and judicial reform as a necessary and promising enterprise.
At first sight there is, of course, the problem of institutional inertia. As one
analyst in the Bank put it “a bank is a bank is a bank.” The Bank’s business is to
lend money and it does so to fund projects where it has experience. Moreover,
people working in the projects that I just described, have developed technical
expertise and have an interest in the projects’ continuation and future fund-
ing. These professional interests are motivated by career aspirations in the
Bank as well as desire for status in the development assistance community
more broadly.
There is also competition and struggle for power, resources, and prestige
among the different units in the Bank. So, despite their doubts about the
projects’ potential, Legal and Public Sector are involved in a race for finding
borrowers and taking on more projects while doing little to reflect on their
results. Apart from competition between them, there is also rivalry within
that could account for the existence of inefficient property rights over time despite the existence
of formal legal institutions and of competitive pressures. North defined institutions as “the
rules of the game in a society” or as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction”. See North, supra note 103 at 3. This broad conception of institutions included
not only formal and state-enforced rules but also informal and uncodified social norms that
effectively constrained behavior. In North’s view, these formal and informal rules, together with
their enforcement mechanisms, provided the framework within which human beings interact.
North’s insistence on the importance of informal rules as building blocks of the institutional
framework seemed to have been lost in the work of the Bank groups reforming laws and
judiciaries aimed at providing an institutional framework conducive to growth. Similarly, his
account on the role of organizations and of their interaction with institutions as the driving force
of institutional change seems to have been left out. Finally, the impact of imperfect information
and ideology on organizational actors’ perception of their gain in altering institutions was
simply neglected. See id.
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Public Sector and Legal among potential project managers seeking to obtain
funds and claim ownership.119 Furthermore, as divisions of the World Bank,
Legal and Public Sector also face external competition from other developing
agencies and regional banks. This external competition lowers the common
denominator for Legal and Public Sector when they perceive that being too
demanding on borrowing countries may encourage countries to seek another
lender with bigger and less conditioned loans. These institutional incentives
and multiple conflicts undermine cooperation between and within Public
and Legal at the expense of the projects and ultimately of results in borrowing
countries.
Evaluating impact. The lack of coordination and sharing of knowledge pre-
vents a practice of evaluation that could capitalize experience and avoid
waste. There is no long-term involvement in the reform projects and thus
analysts rarely take responsibility for failure. Moreover, the lack of evalua-
tions makes it harder to detect problems and, even if setbacks were visible,
nobody has an interest in pointing out that one has occurred.
For more than a decade now, Legal and Public Sector have been in a priv-
ileged position to test their assumptions. They have been involved in a wide
variety of judicial reform projects in different countries and have had the
opportunity to monitor their progress and evaluate their impact. In addition,
these groups have access to an unparalleled breadth of relevant country data
accessible to the Bank. Equally, they have access to the highest authorities in
the borrowing countries and can avail themselves of the information relevant
for assessing the need and impact of their projects. Moreover, they have the
comparative experience that the implementation of judicial reform projects
in so many different countries has given them. Thus, these groups have had
the opportunity to test their theory and corroborate, refute, or modify their
assumptions according to the results of their own endeavors. This seems
largely an opportunity missed.120
One effort to scrutinize the projects’ assumptions however, has been made
by the Public Sector anchor group. Staffed with people not involved in reform
projects, it has engaged with academic criticism and layered the Bank’s dis-
course with a more sophisticated, nuanced, context-specific understanding
119 In addition, Legal faces both an inter-divisional and intra-divisional struggle. Apart from its
quarrels with Public Sector, there is conflict in the Legal Vice Presidency between Legal (the
Legal and Judicial Reform Group) and the country lawyers.
120 Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The problem of knowledge, Carnegie
Endowment Working Paper, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and the Rule of Law Project #34
(2003) http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp34.pdf; Linn Hammergren, Are We There
Yet? Developing Empirically Based Strategies for Judicial Reform (Feb. 2002) (on file with the
author). Published in Spanish as ¿Hemos llegado? El desarrollo de estrategias empı´ricas para
la Reforma Judicial, Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia. No. 23. (Jun. 2002). Caracas.
http://www.clad.org.ve/fulltext/0041020.pdf.
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of the role of law and legal institutions in economic development.121 This
work has the effect of conveying that the Bank is reconsidering or moving
away from its original assumptions. Unfortunately, this work bears practi-
cally no effect in the assembly line of judicial reform projects carried out by
Legal and the operational groups in Public Sector.
In regard to evaluating court reforms’ impact, the divisions of Development
Economics (DEC) and Operation’s Evaluation Department (OED) have done
some research but their efforts aren’t coordinated and their results don’t seem
to affect operations. Except for a handful of assessments published by Legal
to support their own projects, there seems to be a lack of connection between
the barely available research on impact and the content of operations.
Rankings as substitution of evaluation and strategy. At the same time Rapid
Response and WBI, which do not directly participate in the reform of courts,
have produced extensive macroeconomic indicators and statistics to advance
their projects while remaining impermeable to the critiques of the assump-
tions in which they rely, to the self-hesitation of Legal and Public Sector and to
the evidence of the Bank’s decade-long involvement in reforming courts. The
“knowledge,” popularized by the WBI’s Governance Indicators and Rapid’s
Doing Business, comes in handy to the operational groups as a substitute for
evaluation. Thus, it is no surprise that all units in the Bank resort to the Gov-
ernance Indicators and Doing Business benchmarking to justify their work.
These indicators lend force to the credibility and the economic prospects
of judicial reform projects while reinforcing its prominence in development
assistance. To a great extent, reforming the judiciary, in itself, has become a
goal of development policy. That court reform has positive effects on growth
is the default position and skeptics have the burden of proof, rather than the
reverse.
But WBI and Rapid also compete and often undercut each others’ work
to take the upper hand in the reputation market of development assistance.
Moreover, users of these rankings seem to pay little attention to the inconsis-
tencies between the two sets.122 WBI provides Legal and Public Sector with the
121 See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/index.cfm. Formerly called the Legal
Institutions of the Market Economy, this thematic group has recently changed its name to
Law and Justice Institutions, thus reflecting the shift of emphasis in the Bank from a market-
based approach to social development. A good example of the theoretical engagement fostered
here is Richard Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 4.
122 For example, as Linn Hammergren notices, Costa Rica and Uruguay do not score well in Doing
Business but do with “Rule of Law” Governance Indicators. On the other hand, Paraguay and
Nicaragua score high in Doing Business but not with Governance Indicators. Although both
estimates are measuring judicial functioning and its probable effect on stimulating market
activity, they seem to be measuring different things. While WBI focuses on corruption and qual-
ity, Doing Business is looking at speed. For an overview of the problems with current use of statis-
tics to improve courts’ performance, see Linn Hammergren, Making justice count: a review of the
P1: OyK
0521860210c07 CUNY432/Trubek Printer: cupusbw 0 521 86021 0 June 10, 2006 12:26
The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise 293
“evidence” necessary to support their projects. Arguably, the WBI governance
indicators have two components. The first one is descriptive, assessing coun-
try performance on each indicator and drawing a correlation with countries’
income per capita. These governance reports purport to explain bad eco-
nomic performance by identifying poor ratings in any given indicator. Even
though the reports offer a correlation, the indexes derive strength from an
assumed relation of causality between a given indicator and economic per-
formance. Moreover, what is assumed is a unidirectional relation of causal-
ity, going from governance institutions to economic growth and not vice
versa.
The second component is normative and puts forward an agenda for
reform. Once “Governance Indicators” have identified which institutions are
lacking or deficient, the need for reform becomes self-evident. It is important
to notice that measuring governance institutions always entails a compar-
ison. It provides an assessment of governance performance relative to the
rating of other countries. And the project seems to suggest to developing
countries that by adopting the institutions that a few developed countries
have now, growth will ensue in some automatic fashion.
These indicators are widely used within the Bank and are often taken as
hard evidence in both their descriptive and normative facets. For instance,
a comparison of countries based on these benchmarks produces “institu-
tional gaps.” In a research entitled “Lessons from NAFTA for Latin American
and Caribbean Countries,”123 a team of World Bank economists identified
institutional gaps to explain why NAFTA failed to deliver the results free
trade had once promised. Concretely, they argued that institutional gaps con-
strained the reduction of the income per capita gap of Mexico as compared to
the United States. One of the indicators in which Mexico fared worse and thus
mattered most for the analysis was “rule of law.” The research concluded that
a crucial lesson for Latin American countries, then considering a free trade
agreement with the United States, is that they must reduce “their” institu-
tional gap to capture the benefits of trade and spur economic growth. But
this vague conclusion seems to lead us back to the multiplicity of goals that
the ROL may entail, and to the problem that building the rule of law by imple-
menting the Bank’s legal and judicial reform projects hasn’t yielded growth
results.
Moreover, WBI has produced a wide variety of data that correlate its “rule
of law” indicator with other variables, showing the desirability of rule of law
issues and obstacles affecting the use of management statistics for improving Court performance
in Latin America, Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Admin-
istracio´n Pu´blica, 10 (2005 Oct. 18–21 : Santiago) http://www.clad.org.ve/fulltext/0052444.pdf.
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beyond or even regardless of its impact on economic growth. A favorite datum
among these, used by Legal in its latest reports, is the correlation between rule
of law and reduction of infant mortality.124 The implication is clear: attaining a
high level of rule of law is good, even if it has no direct impact on growth. How
are developing countries supposed to improve their institutional quality?
What can help them improve their “rule of law” performance? The answer at
this point is almost self-evident: judicial reform. At this point, the reasoning
can become circular: judicial reform leads to higher levels of rule of law, which
in turn is measured by judicial change.
In contrast to the self-doubt and hesitations expressed by Legal and Public
Sector, the unit responsible for the “Doing Business” report, confidently offers
a “Rapid Response.” “Doing Business” provides a clear-cut solution and easy-
to-implement changes in legislation that will allegedly improve targeted areas
of business regulation and give a boost to economic growth. In support of its
reform agenda, this project argues that the laws of most developing countries
are not indigenous but rather shaped by their colonial heritage. It is “legal
origins” that accounts for variation in regulation across countries. In this
view, legal transplantation suggests systematic variations in regulation that
are “not a consequence either of domestic political choice or of the pressures
toward regulatory efficiency.”125 Therefore, the report suggests, developing
countries have no compelling reason to preserve their current laws. Their
national laws are neither these countries’ own choices in response to their
particular circumstances, nor the result of various competitive forces. Rather,
they will do well to introduce the benchmark rules that have induced better
economic performance around the world. The good news is, of course, that
now Rapid has produced this benchmark.
The Doing Business project upholds many of the assumptions under which
Legal and Public Sector started their work on judicial reform a decade ago.
These assumptions face important challenges. The projects consider regu-
lation in a vacuum, severed from the political and socioeconomic context
that it is supposed to affect and presents a set of legal rules as ready-mades,
packaged as a strategy for development. However, even if it were possible to
identify and isolate a set of rules as crucial for a country’s economic success,
this project assumes that they can be transplanted and take root across the
board notwithstanding different economic, social and political settings. Thus,
Doing Business disregards historical institutional variation among countries
with successful economic experiences as evidence that divergence is not only
possible, but also desirable, as countries respond to their own conditions in
their quest for better economic performance. In sum, by promoting that in
124 See Observations, Experiences and Approach, supra note 1 at 3.
125 Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation xiv, The World Bank (2004) http://rru.
worldbank.org/Documents/DoingBusiness/2004/DB2004-full-report.pdf.
P1: OyK
0521860210c07 CUNY432/Trubek Printer: cupusbw 0 521 86021 0 June 10, 2006 12:26
The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise 295
the area of business regulation one-size fits all, Doing Business ignores that
best practices have been importantly discredited in previous reform efforts
to achieve development.126
Second, the project’s methodology relies primarily on the law in books,
adjusted by a few surveyed lawyers in each country. Doing Business competes
here with the much less ambitious project of Public Sector, doing empirical
studies of court users and court uses in five Latin American countries. This
research has looked at time of disposition and enforcement, identified bot-
tlenecks, considered profiles of plaintiffs and defendants and winners and
losers, yielding different results.127 Although considerably more limited in
breadth and scope than Doing Business, research that looks at actual court
files has found that much of the conventional wisdom on what is wrong and
what needs change in countries’ judicial systems is unwarranted by the avail-
able evidence.
The internal dynamics between units in the Bank respond at least in part to
the question of why “rule of law” reform seems to be flourishing in the Bank on
the face of scholarly criticism, a few practitioners’ self-doubt, and no success
stories. Legal and Public Sector, directly involved in reforming courts, have
great stakes in the continuation of their projects. They compete intensely to
obtain new missions without needing to pay attention to the enduring effects
of their projects, for they have no time to lose and no accountability to worry
about. The statistical work of WBI and Rapid, not involved in operations,
comes as a great relief for and fuels the machinery of court reformers. On the
other hand the continued supply of judicial reforms to borrowing countries
confers greater relevance to the research units and their indicators. Jointly,
the operational groups and the research units take part in a self-reinforcing
mechanism, advocating the many virtues of legal and judicial reform whose
continuation is of their own interest.
The World Bank and the borrowing countries
What happens inside the Bank is only part of the picture. The relevance of
judicial reform in the “rule of law” discourse in development is further rein-
forced by the high demand of judicial reform projects by borrowing countries.
These projects have not been included in the conditionality requirements of
the structural adjustment projects. Rather, they stand alone as projects intro-
duced via technical assistance loans. If these projects are not imposed by
conditionality, what explains their widespread existence and their popularity?
126 For a review of the critiques to best-practices in development theory, see Rittich supra note 3.
127 Linn Hammergren, Using case file analysis to improve judicial reform strategies: the World Bank
experience in Latin America (Nov. 2004) http://www.clad.org.ve/fulltext/0049625.pdf.
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Why is their demand so high?128 The second key to this puzzle lies on the rela-
tions between the Bank staff and government officials in developing coun-
tries and the built-in incentives to keep these projects running. Moreover,
the multiple ROL conceptions that judicial reform projects purport to pursue
make them attractive – for different reasons – to multiple constituencies in
developing countries.
To answer this question I am calling for an analysis that would need to
consider the relationships between the staff members in development insti-
tutions who promote these projects (the lenders) and the government officials
who demand them (the borrowers).129 Although there may be different levels
of analysis, two are of interest at first glance. First, at the professional level,
these people share networks and alliances built up along career paths. Many
professionally successful individuals have held positions in their respective
national governments and now occupy high or relatively important posi-
tions in the Bank.130 And the opposite is also true, relatively successful World
Bank staff members have been appointed with high responsibilities in their
national governments.131 The actual and potential mobility between national
governments and international development institutions, through some sort
of “revolving door,” creates incentives among public officials and interna-
tional development analysts in building relationships among them and sup-
plying and demanding World Bank projects.
Second, at the level of ideas, staff in the World Bank groups and officials
in national governments often share a common intellectual background that
is informed by their educational formation and disciplinary commitments.
Many have attended the same universities to undertake graduate studies
and have worked with the same mentors. Among government officials and
128 In an article titled Don’t Blame Our Failures on Reforms That Have Not Taken Place (The
Fraser Institute Forum, June 2003, available at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/
chapterfiles/Dont%20Blame%20Our%20Failures%20on%20Reforms%20that%20have%
20Not%20Taken%20Place-diaz0603.pdf#). Mexico’s Treasury Secretary, Francisco Gil, calls for
a radical judicial reform. He points out the functioning of the judicial system as the most
important item for market economics to work, asserting that “respect of contracts, essential
to the performance of a market economy, is a rarity” and regretted that “judicial processes are
unpredictable, riddled with corruption, long, and expensive.”
129 I have in mind a sociological analysis of the kind undertaken by Yves Dezaley and Brian Garth,
The Internationalization of Palace Wars – Lawyers, Economists and the Contest to Transform
Latin American States (2002).
130 A notable case in point is Roberto Dan˜ino, the former World Bank’s General Counsel and head
of the Legal Vice Presidency. Dan˜ino was the Peruvian prime minister in the early years of
Toledo’s presidency, and later the Peruvian Ambassador to the United States. Only in the Public
Sector Group of Latin America for instance, are there former cabinet members from Peru and
Bolivia.
131 Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Luis Ernesto Derbez, worked for fourteen years at the
World Bank. He directed, structured, implemented and supervised Multilateral Economic
Assistance and Structural Adjustment Programs in Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala.
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development analysts there are also mentor-mentee relationships that gain
importance as the younger generation of pupils begins to occupy higher ech-
elons in the hierarchy ladder of international institutions. Their relationships
help explain the intellectual commitments that these professionals genuinely
share. These commitments include disciplinary biases and ideas about the
scope of the state’s participation in the market, the ideal type of government,
the specific role of each of the government branches, and the fashion in which
law and legal institutions matter in the development process, among many
others. Thus, in this picture, people promote projects not primarily because
of sheer personal interest but inspired by firm disciplinary creed. When their
views are reflected in a variety of policies promoted by the Bank, such as
judicial reform, professionals from both ends of the development assistance
pipeline strongly advocate them.
A deeper exploration into the realm of ideas would benefit from Duncan
Kennedy’s contribution to this volume, using the three globalizations of legal
thought as a template to situate the transmission of what today constitutes the
most influential legal ideas. This inquiry will help to understand this process
of globalization, exploring the flows of intellectual influence between sites
of production and sites of reception through channels of economic, cultural,
and military power. It can be said that groups in the Bank occupy an important
position in this process and that the ascendancy of judicial reform projects
is related to dominant ideas about modes of legal reasoning, institutional
practices and the primary role of the judge in the United States, which have
become a matter of normalcy and common sense for reformers and importers
alike.
If we now look at the domestic level more deeply, governments in devel-
oping countries seem to have an incentive for implementing judicial reforms
because the multiple purposes for which they are sold appeal to a broad
range of groups in the political spectrum. However, the contradictions and
tensions between these projects’ objectives remain largely obscured by the
vague promise of the rule of law. Local business communities support these
projects because of their alleged prospect of creating a legal environment
more favorable to business. Public officials and political parties endorse these
projects because they promise to control and reduce the corruption that has
plagued many of the governments which introduced the first wave of market-
oriented reforms across the region. Many of the corruption scandals have
involved judges who were bribed by the governments to advance their par-
ticular political interests. Governments offer these projects to the population
assuring them that public funds will not be squandered again.
Judicial reform projects appeal to judges, who see their resources and their
professional status increased. They are of interest to legal scholars, who par-
ticipate as consultants using these projects to leverage their careers. Also,
lawyers are eager to support reforms when they represent an opportunity to
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increase their clients and their expertise. Moreover, the CDF’s emphasis on
participation of local actors has brought incentives on building up a consen-
sus among different actors in the country. This means organizing workshops
and seminars with judges and scholars to design a strategy that all can agree
to. It also means involving as many actors as possible in the strategy: the more
stakeholders involved the more acceptance the reform will have.
In their promise to increase access for the poor and improve legal services,
these projects also appeal to activists and NGOs. Public opinion and civil
society organizations are also attracted by the promise to combat corrup-
tion. Moreover, they favor judicial reform projects because of the perception
that the judicial system is defective and does not serve the population well.
Ironically, judicial systems in Latin American countries may be more inde-
pendent and enjoy more and better technology and human resources than
ever before. But as the judicial system has become the center of attention
and the economic promises that justified the initial judicial reforms have not
been realized, perception of their performance may well have worsened.
A brief example can help illustrate the effect of these dynamics in the pop-
ularity of these projects. The prospect of a judicial reform in Peru caused
bitter divisions between President Toledo and the Supreme Court of Justice
over who was going to lead it.132 The content of the judicial reform was not
the cause of the conflict but rather who it was that was going to take credit
for it. Each government branch may have a different political agenda and a
project for judicial reform represents a good opportunity to advance it. In
cases like this, the World Bank and other development agencies are called
upon to assist in the design and implementation of the project serving at
least two purposes. International development institutions validate coun-
tries’ projects by providing the loans and government officials gain points for
their country in international development institutions for having entered
the club of countries undertaking judicial reforms.
CONCLUSIONS
The consensus about the need of reforming courts, despite a decade of judicial
reform with scant economic results, can be better understood by a conceptual
analysis of the different conceptions of the rule of law at play. The slippage in
the conceptions of the rule of law sheds light on why these projects remain
largely immune to the critique of the assumptions that upheld them and to
their disappointing experience. The use of this “hodge-podge” conception
of the rule of law and the internal dynamics between the groups can also
help understand the self-reinforcing mechanisms within the Bank that make
132 Following President Toledo’s proposal of several emergency reform measures which promi-
nently included judicial reform in his speech of July 28, 2003, the Supreme Court President
announced the Judiciary’s own strategy of a fourteen-point reform program, on August 4th.
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judicial reform seem convenient or appropriate for each of the groups, even if
their versions of the rule of law differ in mutually exclusive ways. The relations
between these groups and the countries which demand these projects fur-
ther sustain the high demand for judicial reform projects without any other
specific plans for economic development, but for the contradictory promises
of the rule of law.
The Bank’s turn from a growth-based development model to a comprehen-
sive development paradigm has led groups reforming countries’ judiciaries –
Public Sector and Legal – to add an intrinsic conception to their formerly pri-
marily instrumental view of the rule of law. In a moment of self-doubt about
their work, this turn has infused fresh air and has given them a renewed hope
if only by changing the expectations rather than the content of their projects.
Judicial reform is now desirable on its own right, as an end in itself and as
part of the holistic view of development that the Comprehensive Develop-
ment Framework promotes.
Through the practice of measuring the best institutions for governance
or benchmarking the best rules for business, the WBI and Rapid Response
validate judicial reforms set in motion by Legal and Public and free these
groups from the difficult task of evaluating their effects. On the other hand,
ongoing reforms stand as the products that give relevance to the indicators
that WBI and Rapid Response produce.
Reform recommendations by WBI and Rapid take for granted that they can
determine which institutions are appropriate and what the quality of regu-
lation must be in each country. They assume they can plausibly identify and
isolate what has worked in the world laboratory, which has already exper-
imented with different institutions. These groups proceed as if these insti-
tutions could be transplanted in order to improve governance and enhance
the environment for doing business across countries. Institutional reforms
are recommended as proven recipes, not as complex choices with multiple
linkages. WBI and Rapid advocate legal reform based on their indicators as
if it was demonstrated that when governance and the business environment
reach certain levels in their ranking, economic development is taking place.
All the World Bank groups under analysis emphasize that the cause for the
gigantic growth differential among countries lies on institutions, and focus
distinctively on reforming law and courts. These projects reinforce the belief
that the cause for a country’s economic stagnation is always local. There
is a paradox in development experts relentlessly repeating that the cause
for economic stagnation is local while frequently introducing a univocal
agenda for reform designed elsewhere. These groups’ reform recommenda-
tions strengthen the belief that what is needed is institutional convergence.
The resulting consensus precludes a contestation of the choices and analysis
of the effects produced by the projects and policies promoted by the World
Bank in developing countries.
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The Bank’s apparent conclusion that all ROL objectives fit into one package
is neither theoretically plausible nor supported by the projects’ experience.
The projects of legal and judicial reform that embody the World Bank’s ROL
agenda are carried out under conditions that prevent an engagement in regard
of their theoretical premises and their effects. These conditions favor lack of
transparency and make it harder to open these projects to scrutiny and eval-
uation. These projects involve considerable amounts of resources and the
opportunity costs for developing countries, which pay for these projects, can
be significant. Finally, these conditions create incentives for policymakers at
the Bank to continue to fund these projects, despite uncertainty and disap-
pointment about results.
In this chapter, I try to contribute to a clearer discussion of the multiple dif-
ferent ROL concepts at play, and to illustrate how, even though some of them
may be mutually exclusive, the invocation of the “hodge-podge” ROL works to
justify policy proposals by shifts in expectations. My analysis of the dynamics
between the different groups of the World Bank aims at highlighting insti-
tutional factors that work to exacerbate this phenomenon. I hope that both
lines of inquiry can lead to a better understanding of the workings of the ROL
as a development strategy and open up some space for critical interventions
that take into consideration the complex role of the World Bank.
